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Preface
In July of 1988, Congress passed the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act, which requires employers of 100 or more workers to pro
vide workers and local government officials with 60 days advance notice before
they shut down or make large scale layoffs. Although legislation calling for
advance notice had been active in Congress every year since 1979, 1988
represented the first year that advance notice legislation passed both houses
of Congress, and President Reagan, although philosophically opposed to the
legislation, bowed to political pressure and did not veto it.
Currently, Canada and most European nations have some form of legisla
tion relating to plant closings or large scale layoffs. A few states in the Untied
States also have their own legislation. Debate over advance notice legislation
has been highly emotional, and little substantive empirical evidence existed
to help guide policy makers. Our monograph represents a comprehensive treat
ment of the subject, and we hope it will contribute to future policy debate.
After summarizing the theoretical arguments for and against plant closing
legislation and the evidence on the extent to which advance notice currently
is provided to displaced workers in the United States in chapter 1, we sum
marize the results of prior empirical research on the effects of advance notice
in chapter 2. The next four chapters contain our own new empirical research,
which makes use of the Bureau of Labor Statistics 1984 Survey of Displaced
Workers and other data sources.
To summarize briefly, we find that having advance notice appears to reduce
the probability that a displaced worker will suffer any spell of unemployment,
but that it has no effect on the individual©s duration of nonemployment if he
or she becomes unemployed or on the individual©s earnings if he or she finds
reemployment. Contrary to concerns expressed by critics of advance notice,
we also find no evidence that advance notice leads a firm©s most productive
workers to quit prior to their planned displacement date, thereby disrupting
a firm©s operations in its final weeks.
As we discuss in the final chapter, ultimately, given all the evidence we
present and cite in the monograph, the position one takes towards advance
notice legislation will depend heavily on one©s preconceptions as to how labor
markets function. Our own position is that given the social costs associated
with worker displacement, a strong case appears to exist for a federal policy
relating to advance notice. We conclude by discussing both inducements that
the federal government might use to encourage employers to voluntarily pro
vide advance notice and the types of research that should be undertaken to
help evaluate the effectiveness of the new federal legislation.
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Introduction

Background
Most European nations have some form of legislation relating to
plant closings or large scale layoffs (table 1.1). Typically, the legis
lation calls for advance notice by employers, with the length of no
tice varying across countries, and for employer negotiations with
employees and government over whether the closing can be averted.
Often, legislation requires severance pay for displaced workers, and
some countries, for example Sweden, have detailed programs of
labor market services (retraining, placement, public works, wage
subsidies) to facilitate adjustments. ! In Canada, both federal and pro
vincial legislation similarly require advance notice, and the notice
required often depends on a worker©s tenure with the establishment
(table 1.2). In many of these countries, small establishments with
less than 100 employees are exempt from the requirements, perhaps
due to the greater failure rate of small businesses or the belief that a
shutdown of a small business does not have a substantial effect on a
community.
Plant closing legislation in the United States is much more mod
est. As of early 1988, there was no federal law and only a few state
laws. Three states, Maine, Wisconsin and Hawaii, require advance
notice of plant shutdowns (with size class exemptions), and Maine
also requires one week©s severance pay per year of service for
workers with greater than three years of tenure. The penalties for
noncompliance are low in Maine ($500 per establishment) and Wis
consin ($50 per employee), but high in Hawaii (three months© wages
and benefits per laid-off worker). Connecticut does not require
advance notice, but does require nonbankrupt firms to maintain
health insurance and other benefits for workers unemployed because
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Table 1.1
Requirements for Advance Notice for Collective
Dismissals in European Legislation, 1983"
Definition of collective dismissals
Belgium
Denmark

France
Germany

Greece
Ireland

Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Sweden
United
Kingdom

Within a 60-day period
a) 6 workers in 20-59 employee firms
b) 10% of workforce in larger firms
Within a 30-day period
a) 10 workers in 21-99 employee firms
b) 10% of workforce in 100-299 employee firms
c) 30 workers in ^300 employee firms
Within a 30-day period
a) 2 workers in firms of >11 employees
Within a 4-week period
a) 6 workers in 21-49 employee firms
b) 10% of workforce or greater than 25
workers in firms employing 50-499 workers
c) 50 workers in >500 employee firms
2-10% of the workforce in firms normally
employing ^50 employees (percentage
changes each year)
Within a 30-day period
a) 5 employees in 21-49 employee firms
b) 10 employees in 50-99 employee firms
c) 10% of workforce in 100-299 employee firms
d) 30 employees in ^300 employee firms
On the same date
2 workers in any firm employing ^ 10 workers
Within a 30-day period, 10 workers
Within a 60-day period, 20 workers
Within a 3-month period
20 workers
5 workers
1 worker

Notice
requirements
30 days
30 days

45 days
and up
30 days

30 days
30 days

22 to 32 days
60 to 75 days
30 days
2 to 6 months
30 to 90 days
(if at least
10 workers
are involved

SOURCE: Authors© interpretation of material in "Collective Dismissals in 10 Countries," Eu
ropean Industrial Relations Review 76 (May 1980): 19-24; and "Collective Dismissals and
Insolvencies," European Industrial Relations Review 109 (Feburary 1983): 12-17.
a. In all cases these are minimum notice provisions. Provisions are typically also found for
consultations with employee representatives with a view towards avoiding or mitigating the
consequences of the dismissals. Relevant public authorities must also be notified and often
their authorization is required. Finally, provisions are also in effect often for severance pay
ments. In the event of employer insolvency, these payments typically come from a state fund.
The figures for Sweden are as of 1980.
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of plant shutdowns for up to 120 days. Massachusetts, Maryland and
Michigan all have voluntary programs in which firms are urged to
provide advance notice and/or continue benefits. Finally, South Caro
lina "requires" employers to give workers two weeks, notice before
shutting down, but only in situations where employees are required
to give advance notice prior to quitting. 2
Interest in plant closing legislation in the United States has grown
since the deep recession of the mid-1970©s, and the relatively large
number of plant closings and permanent layoffs in major manufactur
ing industries since then undoubtedly stimulated this interest. During
the 1975-83 period, over 125 bills relating to plant closings were
introduced in 30 states, the majority in the Northeast and Midwest. 3
More than 90 percent of these bills had provisions requiring advance
notice of shutdowns, while substantially smaller percentages re
quired severance pay or economic assistance to workers, employers,
local governments, or potential buyers.
At the federal level, over 40 bills have been introduced into Con
gress since 1979. Some have called not only for advance notice, but
also for severance pay, maintenance of benefits, and payments to
communities to compensate them for lost revenues. In July of 1987,
the Senate voted to attach an amendment to the Omnibus Trade Bill
(S1420) that would require employers of 100 or more workers to give
60 days advance notice to workers and local government officials of
a plant closing, or a layoff involving at least one-third of the em
ployer©s workforce that was planned to last at least six months.4 The
notice period could be reduced for employers seeking ways to avoid
the shutdown or if "unforeseeable circumstances" occurred. Numer
ous exemptions were included in this bill, including if the employer
relocated the business within a reasonable commuting distance of the
old plant, or if a planned layoff of less than 60 days was extended
due to "unforeseeable circumstances." Penalties for violations of the
act would include pay to displaced employees for each day of viola
tion and a fine of $500 per day of violation for failing to notify local
governments.
In June of 1987, the House Education and Labor Committee ap
proved legislation (HR1122) distinct from its trade bill that had
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Table 1.2
Notice Requirements for Termination of Employment,
Various Jurisdictions in Canada, 1986

Individual termination
Jurisdiction
Federal
Alberta

Minimum length
of service

^2 years
3 mos.-2 years
2 years-5 years
5 years- 10 years
>10 years
3 mos.-2 years
2 years-5 years
5 years- 10 years
slO years
3 months
3 mos.-l year
1 year-5 years
5 years- 10 years
^10 years
3 mos.-l year
1 year-3 years
3 years-5 years
5 years- 10 years
^10 years

1
2
4
8
1
2
4
6
8

British
Columbia

Manitoba

>2 weeks

New Brunswick 6 mos.-5 years
s5 years

Nova Scotia

Ontario

Prince Edward
Island
Quebec

Saskatchewan

Number of Employer
employees
notice

2 weeks
>50
16 weeks
No special legislation
1 week
2 weeks
2 weeks
No special legislation
No. of weeks equal
to years of service
to maximum of
8 weeks
50-100
10 weeks
1 pay period
101-300
14 weeks
>300
18 weeks
2 weeks
^25 if they
4 weeks
4 weeks
represent at
least 25% of
employer©s
workforce
1 week
50-199
8 weeks
200-499
12 weeks
2 weeks
>500
16 weeks
10-99
8 weeks
1 week
2 weeks
100-299
12 weeks
4 weeks
>300
16 weeks
8 weeks
1 week
50-199
8 weeks
2 weeks
200-499
12 weeks
4 weeks
>500
16 weeks
8 weeks
1 week
No special legislation

3 months
3 mos.-2 years
^2 years
6 mos.-2 years
^3 years

Newfoundland

Employer notice

Mass terminations

1 mo. -2 years

week
weeks
weeks
weeks
week
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks

10-99
100-299
>300

8 weeks
12 weeks
16 weeks

No special legislation
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Individual termination
Jurisdiction

Minimum length
of service

Northwest
Territories
Yukon

No notice provisions
6 months

Employer notice

1 week

Mass terminations
Number of
employees

Employer
notice

No special legislation
25-49
4 weeks

50-99
100-299
>300

8 weeks
12 weeks
16 weeks

SOURCE: Extracted from the Canadian Labour Law Reporter (1986) Termination of Em
ployment (11650) and Group Termination of Employment (111655).
a. In some cases, employee notice of intent to terminate employment is also required. The
federal provisions apply to federal employees and employees in regulated industries. Provincial
regulations apply to both public and private employees with certain exemptions. These exemp
tions are both for temporary layoffs of specified durations and also for certain industries.
Some laws also require severance pay. Generally, the penalty for failure to provide the required
notice is payment of the employees© regular wages for the specified period. More details on
each of these provisions are found in the Bureau of National Affairs, Daily Labor Reporter 50
(March 17, 1987) pp. D-l to D-6.

stricter notification requirements. The House bill would require 90
days notice if 50 or more workers were displaced and 180 days no
tice if 500 or more workers were displaced. This bill also contained
a provision that employers must "consult in good faith" with em
ployees, unions, and local government officials about the effects of
plant closings or mass layoffs. 5
In April of 1988, both the House and the Senate passed the Om
nibus Trade Bill that included the Senate©s advance notice amend
ment. President Reagan vetoed the entire bill, stressing among other
factors his opposition to the advance notice provisions.
Political pressure for the passage of advance notice legislation
continued to grow, however, as advance notice became an important
issue during the early stages of the 1988 Presidential campaign. In
July of 1988, Congress passed the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act which requires employers of 100 or more workers to
give workers and local government officials 60 days© advance notice
of a plant closing or a layoff that is planned to last at least
six months and that involves at least 500 workers or one-third of
an employer©s workforce. Although philosophically opposed to the
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bill, President Reagan bowed to political pressures and did not
veto it.
Penalties for failure to provide the required advance notice again
include back pay for each day of violation for displaced workers and
a fine of $500 per day of violation for failing to notify local gov
ernments. Numerous exemptions are included in the Act, including
those employers actively seeking to attract new capital or to sell the
business, and displacements due to "business circumstances that
were not reasonably foreseen." Whether an exemption applies to an
employer who has failed to provide the required notice is to be de
termined by the relevant federal district court upon a suit being filed
by employees or a local government.

Arguments For and Against Plant Closing Legislation
Proponents of plant closing legislation argue that advance notice
provisions would ease displaced workers© shock and facilitate their
search for alternative sources of employment or training. Such notice
also would allow employers, workers and the community to see if
ways exist to save the jobs, such as wage concessions, tax conces
sions, or seeking new ownership, including the possibility of em
ployee ownership. If plants do shut, the maintenance of health
insurance would be important for individuals during a period when
stress leads to increased incidence of physical and mental ailments.
Finally, payments by firms to the communities in which the plants
were located would help alleviate the extra demands placed on these
communities for social services that the shutdowns cause demands
that arise at the same time local property and sales tax revenue are
being reduced.6
Opponents of the legislation argue that, in addition to restricting
the free mobility of capital, advance notice legislation would have a
number of other adverse effects on firms. 7 They claim it would in
crease worker turnover and decrease productivity, as those produc
tive workers with the best opportunities elsewhere would leave and
the morale of remaining workers would suffer. It also would de-
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crease the likelihood that buyers of the plant©s product would place
new orders, that banks would supply new credit, that suppliers
would continue to provide services, and that the firm could sell the
plant to potential buyers. Finally, it would depress corporate stock
prices. Such a provision, as well as others that directly increase the
costs of plant shutdowns, effectively increase the cost of reducing
employment and thus should encourage firms not to expand opera
tion or to substitute overtime hours for additional employment in
states where such laws are in effect.
In evaluating the case for plant closing legislation, it is useful to
stress the divergence between private and social costs. Employers
currently do not bear the full social costs of plant shutdowns, both
because unemployment insurance is imperfectly experience rated and
because the costs shutdowns impose on communities are not taken
into account by them. As such, imposing a "tax" on plant closings,
either in the form of advance notice provisions, severance pay re
quirements, or maintenance of benefits requirements may make
sense; it would have the effect of discouraging the action. These ef
ficiency considerations suggest the need for federal, rather than
state-by-state rules, to reduce the possibility that local tonal decisions
by firms would be influenced by "tax price" differences. Critics,
however, would stress that such legislation might encourage the
flight of jobs overseas.

Outline of This Study
In spite of the growth of legislative efforts, there has been surpris
ingly little empirical effort devoted to analyzing the effects of ad
vance notice; our study seeks to increase our empirical knowledge in
this area. We begin the next section by describing the extent to
which advance notice was provided to displaced workers in the
United States prior to the passage of the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act through existing state legislation, provi
sions in privately negotiated collective bargaining agreements, or
voluntary employer actions. The majority of displaced workers in the
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United States are seen not to have received advance notice of any
meaningful length.
Chapter 2 presents a summary of prior empirical research on the
effects of legislated, privately bargained, and voluntarily provided
advance notice of displacement in the United States and Europe. The
weaknesses of the previous research are highlighted and the contri
butions of our subsequent empirical analyses stressed.
The next three chapters summarize our empirical analyses of ad
vance notice provisions. After describing the data used in chapter 3,
chapter 4 presents analyses of the determinants of which displaced
workers in the United States report receiving advance notice and of
whether those workers who do receive notice implicitly "pay" for it
in the form of lower predisplacement wages. Chapters 5 and 6 then
analyze respectively what the effects of advance notice appear to
be on displaced workers© durations of time out of work and, for
those who find new employment, on their postdisplacement wages.
Chapter 5 also addresses a concern of critics of advance notice
requirements, namely, whether such requirements lead firms© most
productive workers to quit (once notified) prior to their scheduled
displacement dates.
Finally, chapter 7 discusses the implications of our findings for
public policy towards displaced workers. This chapter also indicates
the directions in which future research might profitably go.

Advance Notice of Displaced Workers in the United States
Two employee-based and two employer-based surveys have re
cently collected information on the extent to which displaced
workers in the United States received advance notice of their dis
placement. The employee-based surveys were the Survey of Dis
placed Workers (SOW) supplements to the January 1984 and January
1986 Current Population Surveys; these covered workers who were
displaced during the 1979-83 and 1981-85 periods respectively. 8
The 1984 SOW data is used in our analyses in chapters 4 through 6
and is described in some detail in chapter 3.
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Table 1.3 presents data on the proportion of displaced workers in
these surveys who received advance notice or expected layoffs. For
the purpose of this table, displaced workers are defined as persons
with tenure of at least three years who permanently lost or involun
tarily left a full-time wage and salary job. These data suggest that
over half of the displaced workers covered by these surveys received
advance notice, with displaced females more likely to have received
notice than displaced males, and workers displaced due to a plant
closing more likely to have received notice than workers displaced
Table 1.3
Proportion of Displaced Workers Who Received Advance Notice
or Expected Layoff in the January 1984 and January
________1986 CPS Displaced Worker Supplements________
All displaced
workers

Displaced due
to plant closing

Displaced for
other reasons

January 1984 survey
(workers displaced
in 1979-83)
Persons 20 and over
Persons 20 to 34
Persons 35 to 54
Persons 55 and over
Males 20 and over
Females 20 and over

.56
.57
.56
.56
.55
.60

.61
.62
.60
.61
.58
.66

.52
.53
.52
.48
.52
.51

January 1986 survey
(workers displaced
in 1981-85)
Persons 20 and over
Persons 20 to 34
Persons 35 to 54
Persons 55 and over
Males 20 and over
Females 20 and over

.55
.58
.53
.52
.53
.59

.59
.63
.57
.57
.57
.63

.49
.53
.49
.41
.47
.54

SOURCE: Authors© calculations from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2240, Dis
placed Workers, 1979-83 (Washington, DC: July 1985), tables 6 and B6, and U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2289, Displaced Workers, 1981-85 (Washington, DC: September
1987), tables 6 and B6.
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for other reasons (e.g., layoffs). Younger workers also appear more
likely to have received notice than older workers.
While at first glance these data suggest that prior to the passage of
federal legislation, advance notice was widespread in the United
States, we must caution that the question asked respondents in this
survey did not distinguish between receipt of formal notice and sim
ply expectation of displacement.9 The survey also provided no infor
mation on the duration of the advance notice. This was a second
crucial shortcoming, since the effectiveness of advance notice poli
cies presumably depend at least partially on how far in advance no
tice is given. 10
The two employer-based surveys suffer from neither of these
shortcomings. The first, a September 1986 survey of establishments
in seven states that, during the last half of 1985, reported "layoff
events" of 30 days or more in which 50 or more initial unemploy
ment insurance claims were tiled in a three-week period by former
employees, was conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). 11 The second, a nationwide random sample of establish
ments in which layoffs of 100 or more workers occurred in 1983
or 1984, was conducted by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO). 12
Table 1.4 summarizes information from the two employer-based
surveys on the frequency and duration of advance notice. The pre
cise definitions of advance notice differ between the two surveys (see
table 1.4), however in this table "general notice" relates to notice
that a layoff would occur sometime in the future, while "specific
notice" relates to individual employees being given specific termina
tion dates.
These data present a much different picture from the employeebased data about the prevalence of advance notice for displaced
workers in the United States. While the results differ across the two
surveys (which differ in coverage and time frame), it is clear that
only a small fraction of employers provide workers about to be dis
placed with either general or specific advance notice of at least one
month. Indeed, over 80 percent of the establishments in the BLS
survey provided either no notice or notice of less than two weeks,
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Table 1.4
Comparison of the Distribution of Advance Notice Provided
by Establishments in the BLS and GAO Surveys8______
General notice1*

Specific notice0

Length of notice

BLS

GAO

BLS

GAO

No notice
1-14 days
15-30 days
31-90 days
91 days and over

64
16
6
10
4

24
25
17
17
17

5
78
9
8
d

31
34
15
15
5

SOURCE: Sharon Brown, "How Often Do Workers Receive Advance Notice of Layoffs?"
Monthly Labor Review (June 1987), pp. 13-17 and table 6.
a. BLS—Bureau of Labor Statistics September 1986 survey of establishments in seven states
that, during the last half of 198S reported "layoff events" of 30 days or more in which 50 or
more initial unemployment insurance claims were filed in a 3-week period by former employees.
GAO—Government Accounting Office nationwide random sample of establishments that fo
cused on those in which layoffs of 100 or more workers occurred in 1983 and 1984.
b. General Notice—In the BLS study, defined as informing individual employees that they
will be laid off without specifying the exact date. In the GAO study, defined as informing
groups of workers that some or all of them may be laid off.
c. Specific Notice—In the BLS study, defined as informing individual employees the specific
date on which they will be laid off. In the GAO study, a similar definition was used,
d. Less than .5 percent.

while about 50 (65) percent of the establishments in the GAO survey
provided either no general (specific) notice or general (specific) no
tice of less than two weeks.
Some data on the prevalence of advance notice broken down by
industry, establishment size, occupational category, and union status,
are reported in tables 1.5 and 1.6 for the BLS and GAO surveys,
respectively. What emerges from these tables is that differences in
the frequency and length of advance notice appear to have existed
along some of these dimensions. For example, employees at union
ized establishments were more likely to have notice than employees
at nonunion ones and employees at large establishments were more
likely to have notice than employees at small establishments. We
will discuss in chapter 4 why such differences might occur.
The conclusion one draws from these data is that many displaced
workers in the United States have received either no advance notice
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Table 1.5
Percentage of Establishments with Mass Layoffs Providing
Advance Notice hi the BLS Survey: By Industry and Union Status8
With advance
general notice
Total, all industries
Agriculture
Nonagriculture
Manufacturing
Durable
Nondurable
Nonmanufacturing
Wholesale and
retail trade
Services
Other Nonmanufacturing

With specific notice
of more than 1 day

(A)

(U)

(N)

(A)

(U)

(N)

35
[46]
0

38
[51]

37
[42]
0

53
[13]

50
[24]
37

37
[46]
42
[45]
41
[54]
46
[25]
19
[54]
37
[84]
23
[23]
14
[54]

38
[51]
44
[50]
38
[63]
59
[27]
17
[59]

41
[43]
48
[43]
49
[53]
45
[13]
21
[43]

52
[18]
37
[40]
58
[18]
63
[18]
60
[19]
69
[15]
42
[18]
37
[18]
50
[19]
41
[18]

53
[13]
60
[13]
60
[14]
59
[U]
35
[10]

51
[23]
56
[22]
53
[26]
65
[12]
39
[27]

a. Authors© calculations from Sharon P. Brown, "How Often Do Workers Receive Advance
Notice of Layoff?" Monthly Labor Review (June 1987) tables 1 and 2.
where
(A) all establishments
\
Union status was reported by establishments in
(U) union establishments
}
only six of the seven states. Thus, the numbers
(N) nonunion establishments j
in (U) and (N) do not necessarily add up to those in (A).
[ ] mean duration of notice (in days)

of their displacement or notice of only very short duration. Thus,
federal advance notice legislation does have the potential to substan
tially increase both the frequency and duration of notice that dis
placed workers receive.
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Table 1.6
Length of Specific Advance Notice Provided By
Establishments in the GAO Survey
Percent of establishments that provided
Category

No 1 to!4 15 to 30 30 to 90 91 days
notice days
days
days or more

All establishments

32

34

15

14

5

Blue-collar workers
Union
Nonunion
Plant closures
Permanent layoffs
Manufacturing
Nonmanufacturing
Less than 250 employees
More than 250 employees

31
19
42
29
32
34
26
35
23

36
40
31
24
39
36
35
32
44

14
18
13
14
14
14
16
13
17

14
18
10
22
12
12
18
15
11

5
5
4
11
3
4
5
5
5

White-collar workers
Union
Nonunion
Plant closures
Permanent layoffs
Manufacturing
Nonmanufacturing
Less than 250 employees
More than 250 employees

28
21
31
25
29
31
23
31
21

31
37
26
17
36
34
26
29
35

19
19
20
21
18
17
21
17
21

16
17
16
28
12
13
21
17
15

6
6
7
0
5
5
9
6
8

SOURCE: United States General Accounting Office, Plant Closings, Limited Advance Notice
and Assistance Provided Dislocated Workers (Washington, DC: Superintendent of Documents,
July 1987), appendix tables VII-6 through VII-19.

NOTES
1. Bjorklund and Holmlund (1987) present a discussion of Swedish policies.
2. See Cline (1984).
3. See Burchell et al. (forthcoming).
4. See Bureau of National Affairs (1987a).
5. See Bureau of National Affairs (1987b).
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6. See, for example, Bluestone and Harrison (1982).
7. See, for example, McKenzie (1982).
8. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1985; 1987).
9. Moreover, because the question was asked ex post, or after the fact, one cannot distinguish
between true notice or ex ante expectation on the one hand, and ex post rationalization on the
other hand. As we will discuss in chapter 8, this distinction is crucial in evaluating the poten
tial effects of legislated advance notice provisions.
10. Both shortcomings are remedied in the Survey of Displaced Workers that is part of the
January 1988 Current Population Survey.
11. See Brown (1987).
12. See U.S. General Accounting Office (1987).

Do Advance Notice Provisions Matter?

Previous empirical research on the effects of legally mandated,
collectively bargained, or voluntarily provided advance notice for
displaced workers has been of two types. One set of studies focuses
on the effects of advance notice provisions on employment-related
variables at the national or community level. The second, and by far
more numerous, set of studies examines the effects of provision of
advance notice on individual displaced workers and employers. We
discuss the two sets in turn and then indicate what our own empirical
contributions will be.

Studies at the National or Community Level
Lazear (1987) used annual aggregate data for 23 countries (the
U.S., Canada, many European countries, Hong Kong, and Australia)
over a 29-year period (1956 to 1984) to estimate what the effects of
legally mandated severance pay and advance notice provisions for
blue-collar workers were on the aggregate employment/population
ratio, unemployment rate, and average weekly hours in manufactur
ing. The severance pay variable used was a measure of severance
pay due displaced workers with 10 years of service, while the ad
vance notice variable used was the number of months of notice re
quired for workers with this job tenure. If a country did not have
such provisions in a year, these variables were set equal to zero for
the year. Simple fixed-effects models (to control for country-specific
omitted variables) were estimated and a small set of control vari
ables (e.g., a linear time trend, cyclical factors, and demographic fac
tors) were included in the analysis.
15
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He found that instituting or increasing the length of an advance
notice requirement tended to increase the employment/population ra
tio and decrease average weekly hours, although both effects were
statistically insignificant. He attributed these results to the fact that
most countries that have laws requiring advance notice exempt parttime employees who are displaced. Thus, the laws encourage the
substitution of part-time for full-time employees. 1 One must caution,
however, that in most countries in Lazear©s sample, changes oc
curred in advance notice requirements only once or twice during the
period.
Folbre, Leighton and Roderick (1984) is the only study of U.S.
data that examined the effects of advance notice of plant closings on
local area unemployment rates and labor force size. They examined
the effects of major plant closings (those involving more than 100
workers) in Maine in a period prior to advance notice becoming
mandatory in the state, and found that voluntary provision by a firm
of at least one month advance notice to displaced workers signifi
cantly diminished the closing©s impact on the local area unemploy
ment rate in the month of closing. While this may be due to more
rapid reemployment of displaced workers in the presence of ad
vanced notice, their results also suggest that advance notice was as
sociated with a significant reduction in the size of the local labor
force in the month of the closing. The latter reflects either labor
force withdrawal or outmigration (and possible reemployment else
where); they were unable to ascertain which had occurred.

Studies at the Establishment or Individual Level
Two studies have utilized data from a small number of plants that
ceased operations. One early study, Weber and Taylor (1963), fo
cused on 32 plant closings in the late 1950s and early 1960s and
found that voluntarily provided advance notice rarely led to in
creased quit rates or decreased productivity of workers. The second
study, Holen, Jehn, and Trost (1981), analyzed the experiences of
9,500 displaced workers from 42 plants that closed and found that
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provision of advance notice was associated with larger earnings
losses for the displaced workers; at first glance, a somewhat para
doxical result.
In each of the above studies and indeed in all of those discussed
below, provision of advance notice was treated as exogenous. If the
existence of advance notice provisions is determined by other vari
ables, however, biased estimates of the provisions© true effects may
result. For example, suppose that those employers who perceive they
would face increased quit rates prior to the shutdown date if they
provide their workers with advance notice do not provide such
notice, while those employers who perceive they would not face
increased turnover do provide notice. To the extent that these percep
tions are correct, only low "expected increase in turnover" firms
would provide notice and one would not observe turnover increasing
in those firms after notice was provided (Weber and Taylor©s find
ings). This would not, however, tell us anything about the likely ef
fects of legally mandated advance notice on turnover. Similarly, if
advance notice were to arise primarily in situations in which the em
ployment prospects faced by displaced workers were the worst, a
comparison of earnings losses suffered by workers with notice to the
losses incurred by those who failed to receive notice would show
that the former lost more (Helen, Jehn, and Trost©s finding). How
ever, this finding again would not imply that legally mandated ad
vance notice would make workers worse off.
Recently several studies have analyzed data from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics January 1984 Survey of Displaced Workers (SOW), a
supplement to the Current Population Survey. 2 The 1984 SOW is a
special supplement to a national probability sample of households
that was administered to workers permanently displaced during the
1979-84 period due to a plant shutdown or layoff. It contains in
formation on the individuals© predisplacement earnings, survey date
earnings (if employed), weeks of nonemployment since displacement
and whether the individuals received advance notice or expected
their displacement. It contains no information on whether the notice
was formal or how far in advance it was given. This is a crucial
omission, since, as noted in chapter 1, the effectiveness of advance
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notice policies presumably depends at least partially on how far in
advance notice is given.
The various studies yield somewhat mixed findings. Rowland
(1988) limited her analyses to a small subsample of the displaced
workers located in SMSAs so that she could merge in controls for
area economic conditions. She found that, on average, workers dis
placed from manufacturing jobs due to plant shutdowns who received
advance notice did not benefit from the notice, although white-collar
workers did appear to have shorter durations of nonemployment. In
addition, the approximately 10 percent of workers who received ad
vance notice and then quit prior to displacement appeared to suffer
smaller wage losses and fewer weeks of nonemployment than those
who failed to receive notice.
Addison and Portugal (1986; 1987a) concentrated their attention
on workers displaced due to plant shutdowns, did not include any
controls for area economic conditions in their analyses and found
that, ceteris paribus, the presence of advance notice was associated
with durations of nonemployment that were some 35 percent shorter.
For workers who received unemployment insurance (UI) after dis
placement (which meant, given UI rules in most states, those with
more than one week of unemployment) the negative association of
advance notice and duration was found only for white-collar employ
ees. For both white- and blue-collar workers who failed to receive UI
after displacement, a negative association between advance notice
and duration of nonemployment was found. This latter result is not
surprising; if advance notice helps some workers to find employment
without an intervening spell of unemployment, these workers will
never be eligible for UI benefits. Put another way, the presence of
advance notice may increase the probability that displaced workers
fail to receive UI. While Addison and Portugal (1986) treated the
receipt of UI as endogenous, they did not allow receipt of advance
notice to influence receipt of UI.
Podgursky and Swaim (1987a) restricted their attention to those
workers displaced during the 1979-81 period. Using a set of control
variables (they included the area unemployment rate in the year of
displacement) slightly different from Addison and Portugal (1987a),
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they found that advance notice significantly reduced nonemployment durations only for white-collar females. Podgursky and Swaim
(1987b) studied the determinants of postdisplacement earnings for
workers who were subsequently employed full time at the survey
date. They found no effects of advance notice, suggesting that such
policies have, at best, transitional effects.
Finally, Addison and Portugal (1987b) found that a 10 percent in
crease in duration of unemployment decreased postdisplacement
wages by about 1 percent. Since their results (in a paper which fo
cused on 1 aid-off displaced workers, as well as those displaced by
plant closings) also indicate that advance notice reduced duration
of unemployment by about 25 percent, one can infer that advance
notice increases postdisplacement wages by about 2.5 percent. One
must caution, however, that the duration-wage relationship is condi
tional on a displaced worker©s having remained in the same industry
and occupation. Moreover, their specifications did not permit ad
vance notice to have a direct effect on postdisplacement wages.

Our Own Research
The research reported in this monograph reanalyzes the 1984 Sur
vey of Displaced Workers (SDW) data, making a number of method
ological innovations. First, in the absence of formal legislation
requiring advance notice, one can view advance notice as an explicit
or implicit contract provision that is desirable to have from workers©
perspective and ask if workers must pay for this provision in the
form of lower predisplacement wages? That is, we ask if compensat
ing wage differentials exist for advance notice provisions? If the an
swer is yes, it is straightforward to show that displaced workers who
receive advance notice will appear, ceteris paribus, to suffer smaller
earnings losses than those who fail to receive notice, even if advance
notice has no true effect on postdisplacement wages.
Second, as noted above, the presence of an advance notice pro
vision is likely endogenous and depends upon both employers© will
ingness to supply, and employee demand for such provisions. We
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attempt to formally model the determinants of advance notice, in
cluding the magnitude of the compensating wage differential, and
then test whether treating advance notice as endogenous influences
subsequent results. To do this requires us to merge into the SOW data
an extensive set of industry and area variables.
Third, previous researchers have not stressed that about 10 percent
of the males and over 15 percent of the females hi the SDW suffered
no spell of nonemployment after displacement. We estimate sepa
rately what the effect of advance notice was on the probability of a
displaced worker finding a job without any spell of nonemployment
and what it was on the duration of nonemployment (conditional on a
spell existing). 3 We also estimate what the effects of advance notice
were on survey date wages. In each of these analyses we employ a
much more extensive set of controls for industry and area character
istics than previous researchers did.
Fourth, since the SDW contains data on whether workers who re
ceived advance notice quit prior to displacement, we estimate the
determinants of predisplacement turnover and ascertain if there is
any evidence that turnover among firms© most productive workers
occurs. Finally, all of our analyses are done separately for four
groups (male/displaced due to a plant shutdown, female/displaced
due to a plant shutdown, male/displaced due to a layoff, female/dis
placed due to a layoff) to see if such policies have differential effects
across groups.

NOTES
1. See Ehrenberg, Rosenberg, and Li (1988) for a discussion of other factors that influence the
substitution of part-time for full-time employees.
2. See chapter 3 for a more complete description of the SDW.
3. After a paper summarizing our research was widely circulated, Swaim and Podgursky
(1988) performed a similar analysis, citing their awareness of our work.

Data Used in Our Analyses
The 1984 Survey of Displaced Workers
This supplement to the January 1984 Current Population Survey
contains data for approximately 11,000 adult workers, age 20 and
older, who were permanently displaced from jobs during the 197983 period because of plant closings (including those due to employ
ers going out to business), layoffs from which they had not been
recalled, seasonal factors, self-employed business failures, or other
reasons. ! We restricted our attention to those workers displaced from
a full-time job due to a plant closing or layoff. These restrictions
reduced the sample we analyzed to 7,365 individuals. Sample size
was further reduced in many of our analyses because data were not
reported by some individuals for some variables.
Questions were asked of each individual in the SOW supplement
about the nature of the job the individual was displaced from (in
cluding earnings as of the date of displacement), the year displace
ment took place, the nature of the person©s survey date job
(including earnings) if employed, and total weeks of nonemployment
experienced by the individual since the displacement. In addition,
each individual was asked if he or she had expected, or had re
ceived advance notice of, the displacement. Individuals who an
swered in the affirmative were also asked if they quit their job prior
to the date at which they would have been displaced. A complete
description of the variables used in our analyses from the SOW is
found in the top panel of table 3.1.
At the time our analyses were undertaken, the SOW supplement
was the best available source of data to use in research on displaced
workers. However, it has a number of weaknesses that should be ac
knowledged. First, it asks individuals if they had expected, or had
21
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Table 3.1
Variable Definitions and Sources

Variable name

Description

1) From the January 1984 Current Population Survey—individual data*

AGET
AGET2
REDUC
REDUC2
AGEED
TENURE
TEN2
RRACE
RHISP
RMAR
RVET
RHINST
MAINE
WISC
MSMSA
MANUF
RUI
WCOL
RADV
REARNT
REARNN
SHUT
DURNON
YD1
YD2
YD3
YD4
YDS
Rl
R2
R3

age in years, at date of displacement
age in years squared at the displacement date
years of schooling completed
years of schooling squared
age times years of schooling
years of continuous tenure prior to displacement
years of tenure squared
1 = nonwhite, 0=white
1 = Hispanic, 0 = other
1 = married spouse present, O = other
1 = male veteran, 0 = other
1 =had health insurance at job before displaced, 0 = other
*
1 = reside in Maine, 0=other
1 = reside in Wisconsin, 0 = other I at survey date
1 = reside in an SMSA, 0=other J
1 = displaced from manufacturing job, 0=other
1 = received UI when displaced, 0=other
1 = white-collar worker when displaced, 0 = other
1 = received advance notice of job loss, 0=other
usual weekly earnings when displaced, converted to 1984
dollars
usual weekly earnings at the survey date (1/84)
1 = lost job due to plant shutdown, 0=lost job due to
layoff
weeks out of work since displacement (maximum is 99)
1= displaced in 1979, 0 = other
1984 is the
1 = displaced in 1980, 0=other
1 = displaced in 1981, 0 = other . omitted year
1= displaced in 1982, 0 = other
1 = displaced in 1983, 0 = other
v
1 = reside in Northeast, 0 = other
1 = reside in Northcentral, 0 = other I West is the
J omitted region
1 = reside in South, 0=other
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Table 3.1 (continued)
Description

2) Data merged in by matching individuals' CPS 3-digit industries prior to dis
placement with data for 52 broad industry groups from the 1980 Census of Popu
lation, a 1978 BLS special report on job tenure, and the March 1984 Current
Population Surveyb
EMALE
percentage male
E3LACK
percentage black
IHISP
percentage Hispanic
IAGE
median age
ICOL
percent college graduates
DiS
percent high school graduates
ITEN
median job tenure
IAS5
percentage older than age 55
IPROF
percent professional workers
IADS
percent administrative and technical support workers
IBCS
percent blue-collar skilled workers
percent blue-collar unskilled workers
3) Data merged in by matching individuals' predisplacement CPS 3-digit industry*
IUNION
percent unionization in the industry in the year prior to
displacement
4) Data merged in by matching individuals' predisplacement industry, year of
displacement, and area (SMSA if available, otherwise state) of displacement to
area data on unemployment, employment by major (1 -digit) industry groups and
unionization
AUNEMP
area unemployment rate two years prior to displacement
AUNEMPC
change in the area unemployment rate in the year prior to
displacement
AEMPC1
annual percentage change in nonagricultural employment in the
area from 1975 to two years prior to displacement
AEMPC2
percentage change in nonagricultural employment in the area in
the year prior to displacement
AEMPC3
same as AEMPC1, but for major industry group employment in
the area
AEMPC4
same as AEMPC2, but for major industry group employment in
the area
AUNION
percent unionization in the area in the year prior to displacement
AU
area unemployment rate in the year prior to displacement
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Table 3.1 (continued)

Variable name

Description

___

5) Data merged in by matching on the individual's 3-digit census industry prior to
displacement

estimated 3-digit industry wage premium, associated with job
prior to displacement, from regressions using May 1979 CPS
__________data__________________________________
WDIF

a. Individual data is from the January 1984 Current Population Survey. The sample is re
stricted to individuals who lost or left their last job since January 1979 due to a plant closing,
slack work, or a position being eliminated, and who were working full time at the date of
displacement.
b. Data sources IMALE to IMS 7980 Census of Population. ITEN 7980 Census of Popula
tion and BLS Special Labor Force Report 235 Job Tenure Declines as Work Force Changes
(Washington, D.C., 1980) (industry job tenure data were for January 1978). IA55 to ffiCU
March 1984 Current Population Survey. The correspondence of the 3-digit census codes to the
broad industry groups is found in appendix A.
c. Unionization data is from Edward Kokkelenberg and Donna Sockell, "Union Membership
in the United States," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 38 (July 1985): 497-543.
d. Unemployment and employment data come from various issues of Employment and Earn
ings. Unionization data are from the Kokkelenberg and Sockell article cited above,
e. The major industry groups used are manufacturing, mining, construction, transportationcommunications-utilities, wholesale and retail trade, finance-insurance-real estate, and service
employment (no data were collected for agriculture and government employees).

received, advance notice of their displacement. Researchers have no
way of knowing if an affirmative answer meant formal notice was
received, or what the length of any such formal notice was. 2 Since
the effectiveness of advance notice presumably depends upon the
notice being sufficiently long to both facilitate labor market ad
justments and to allow for the provision of additional services (job
counseling, job placement assistance, etc.), this is a serious limita
tion which causes the analyses reported in later chapters to likely
understate the effects of advance notice of, say, 60 days. Moreover,
no information is provided in the SOW about any services that may
have accompanied advance notice.
Second, while total weeks of nonemployment an individual expe
rienced since the displacement date was reported, no information
was collected on whether these weeks were spent in unemployment
or out of the labor force. Similarly, no information was collected on
whether the individual had experienced multiple spells of nonem-

Data Used in Our Analyses

25

ployment and hence possibly multiple jobs since the displacement
date. Because of this, one cannot be sure that only a single spell of
nonemployment was experienced by the displaced workers. 3
Third, respondents to the survey were asked in January of 1984 to
report their durations of nonemployment over the previous five
years. As is well known, such retrospective questions are subject to
recall error; people©s perceptions of events "fade" the further away
in time the events occurred.4 Evidence to support the contention that
such errors occurred in the SOW is that respondents© reported dura
tions of nonemployment were concentrated at round numbers, such
as 13 weeks (3 months), 26 weeks (6 months), 39 weeks (9 months),
52 weeks (1 year), and 78 weeks (1^ years). While some of this
concentration is due to the higher likelihood that respondents find
work at the date unemployment benefits are exhausted (e.g., after 26
or 39 weeks) than at other dates, the "spikes" that occurred in the
distribution of nonemployment durations at longer durations suggest
that recall error was a problem. 5
Fourth, the SDW data contain no information on whether the in
dividual was employed in a job covered by a collective bargaining
agreement when he or she was displaced and it contains informa
tion for only one-quarter of the sample as to whether individuals
employed at the survey date were employed in a unionized estab
lishment. 6 The former omission is particularly unfortunate since, to
the extent that advance notice provisions are more prevalent in
unionized that nonunionized settings (see table 1.6), estimates of ef
fects that we subsequently attribute to the existence of advance notice
may instead be due to the presence of a union.
Finally, the SDW covers only workers who have been displaced. It
contains no information on individuals whose potential displacement
was averted due to the presence of an advance notice provision.
Thus, the SDW does not permit us to test whether the existence of
advance notice provisions can help to avert layoffs or shutdowns, as
proponents argue. Similarly, since the SDW is an individually-based,
rather than an establishment-based, data set, it does not permit us to
test whether advance notice adversely affects employee productivity,
as critics of advance notice argue.

26

Data Used in Our Analyses

Merging in Industry, Area, and Industry/Area Data
A major advantage of the SOW is that it provides information on
the detailed (3-digit SIC) industry in which each individual was em
ployed prior to his or her displacement. Information is also provided
on the state in which each individual resided as of the survey date
and, for individuals who resided in one of the largest 57 standard
metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs), the name of that SMSA.
Since approximately 18 percent of the individuals in our sample
moved to a different city or county between their dates of displace
ment and the survey date, this means that we can unambiguously
identify which state, and in some cases which SMSA, over 80 per
cent of our sample resided in at the dates of their displacement.
This information is important to us because characteristics of the
industry in which an employee was employed and the area in which
an employee resided at the date of his displacement may influence
the employee©s duration of nonemployment after displacement and
postdisplacement earnings, as well as the likelihood that the em
ployee received advance notice of the displacement. For example,
other things equal, the higher the rate of unemployment in an area or
the slower the rate of growth of employment in an industry in an
area, the longer a displaced worker©s duration of nonemployment
and the lower his postdisplacement earnings might be expected to be.
Similarly, other things equal, workers employed in industries that
were heavily unionized might be more likely to be covered by a for
mal advance notice provision than workers in industries that were not
heavily unionized. Failure to include area and industry variables in
empirical analyses of the determinants of advance notice, duration of
nonemployment, and postdisplacement wages for displaced workers
leaves open the possibility that the analyses suffer from omitted vari
able bias; one cannot be sure, if these variables are omitted, that
parameter estimates are unbiased.
As indicated in chapter 2, it is somewhat surprising that previous
studies using the SOW either added only a few industry and area
variables to the data or ignored such variables completely. We have
gone to considerable effort to our research to merge a large number
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of industry, area and industry/area variables into the SOW data and
then to include these variables in our analyses. A complete listing of
the variables we collected and used are found in the second through
fifth panels of table 3.1.
Data on the demographic characteristics of workers employed in
each individual©s predisplacement industry of employment were ob
tained from the 1980 Census of Population, a 1978 BLS special
report on job tenure, and the March 1984 Current Population Sur
vey. 7 Data on the percent of unionization in the industry in which
each individual was employed prior to displacement and in the area
in which he resided were obtained from an article (cited in table 3.1,
note c) that used data from a number of Current Population Survey
data tapes. Data on area unemployment rates and employment
changes, as well as area/industry employment changes were obtained
from various issues of Employment and Earnings. Finally, an esti
mate of the wage differential associated with employment in the 3digit industry in which an individual was employed prior to
displacement was obtained from the estimation of wage equations
that utilized the May 1979 Current Population Survey data. 8 Details
about how the wage equations were estimated and the rationale for
our use of each of the variables in table 3.1 appear in subsequent
chapters.
NOTES
1. For a complete description of the data and many tables of cross-tabulation, see U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics (198S). The tabulations there, however, are limited to those displaced work
ers who had worked at least three years on their jobs prior to displacement. We do not limit
our analyses in subsequent chapters to workers with at least this job tenure. However, we
do test in places whether the results that we obtain differ across tenure classes of displaced
workers.
2. As noted in chapter 1, the BLS has recently conducted a new displaced worker survey as a
supplement to the January 1988 Current Population Survey that more precisely asks whether
formal notice was received and how long that notice was. This data should become available
to researchers in early 1989.
3. This suggests that prior sophisticated statistical analyses of the SOW data that act as i/all
individuals in the sample experienced only one spell of nonemployment and interpret their
findings as providing information about the probability of displaced workers leaving nonem
ployment (e.g., Addison and Portugal (1987a)) are somewhat misleading.
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4. For discussions of recall error, see Panel on Incomplete Data (1983), Horvath (1982), and
Akerlof and Yellen (1985).
5. See Moffit and Nicholson (1982) for evidence that unemployment insurance recipients
probability of leaving unemployment rises at the date they exhaust their UI benefits.
6. The union status of respondents employed at the survey date was asked only of individuals
in two of the eight rotation groups in the CPS.
7. These data were reported in less industry detail than is found in the SOW. Appendix A
indicates how we merged these industry-level variables into the SOW.
8. We also collected other industry-level variables, for example, changes in imports each year
by industry. Once we controlled for the variables found in table 3.1, the import variables never
proved statistically significant in any of our analyses.

The Determinants of Advance
Notice—Do Workers Pay For It?

In the absence of advance notice legislation, the collective bar
gaining process may provide workers covered by union contracts
with some guarantees of advance notice of impending displacement.
If a union wants such a contract provision, it must win it at the bar
gaining table.
Of course, if the provision is costly to management (as opponents
of legislation allege), management would agree to it only if the
union agrees to give up something in return. One possibility is that
the union may "pay" for the advance notice provision by agreeing to
either a lower wage increase or a lower wage level. If this occurs,
advance notice provisions would "affect" preunemployment wages.
To date, no study has examined whether such a form of compensat
ing wage differential arises, although a number of studies have found
that unions often win compensating wage differentials for other un
favorable job characteristics. !
Now consider nonunion employers. To the extent that their work
ers also value implicit or explicit promises that advance notice of any
impending displacement will be provided, employers who offer such
promises should be able to also offer their workers lower predisplacement wages. In this case, market forces would lead to a com
pensating wage differential for the promise of advance notice.
Suppose advance notice provisions have no effect on displaced
workers© postdisplacement wages. If displaced workers with ad
vance notice do have lower predisplacement wages than those with
out advance notice because of the above forces, the former will
appear to suffer smaller wage losses. 2 However, this would not im
ply that advance notice was a desirable policy (since we assumed
29
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that it had no effects on postdisplacement wages). Rather it would
reflect only the willingness of workers to "pay" for advance notice.
It should be clear then why it is important to study whether compen
sating wage differentials for advance notice arise.
This chapter provides an analysis of the determinants of which
displaced workers in the January 1984 SOW reported receiving
advance notice and whether those who did receive notice impli
citly paid for it in the form of lower predisplacement wages. After
sketching out our analytical framework, we present the empirical
results.

Analytical Framework
Consider first the question of whether unionized workers whose
collective bargaining agreements require advance notice of displace
ments due to layoffs or plant closings must pay for these provisions
in the form of lower preunemployment wages. Restricting ourselves
to unionized workers and assuming that all people who received ad
vance notice had an explicit or implicit advance notice provision in
their contract, a naive approach to the problem would be as follows. 3
If the preunemployment wage of the ith individual is W^ if he or
she works under a contract which has an advance notice provision
and WJN if he or she works under a contract without such a provi
sion, then the relative wage differential the worker implicitly pays
for the provision (dj) can be defined as
(4.1) di =(WiA -WiNVWiN«log(WiA/WiN)
and values of d; that are less ©than zero would indicate that workers
must pay to obtain the provision.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to observe both WiA and W^ in
our survey data, because prior to displacement each individual was
either covered by an advance notice provision or not. A naive ap
proach to circumvent this problem would be to estimate wage equa
tions separately for individuals covered by and not covered by such
provisions, to use the estimated coefficients from these regressions
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and the characteristics of a representative individual to compute pre
dicted values of the predisplacement wage rate that the individual
would receive in both "sectors," and then to estimate the dif
ferential by calculating the percentage difference in these predicted
values.
More formally, suppose that the wage rate an individual would
receive in a job with an advance notice provision is a log linear func
tion of a vector of variables X that represent characteristics of the
individual (e.g., education) and employer (e.g., industry) plus an
error term eiA
(4.2) log WiA=2aJAXji+eiA
and that a similar functional relationship describes the individual©s
wage in the absence of the provision
(4.3) log WiN=2ajNXji+ iN.
The naive approach would involve estimating the parameters of
equation (4.2) by ordinary least squares (OLS) from observations on
individuals who work under contracts with advance notice provisions
and the parameters of equation (4.3) by OLS from observations on
individuals who are not covered by such provisions. Given estimates
of these parameters, otjA ,ajN , and the characteristics of a representa
tive individual and his employer, Xj,, an estimate of the relative wage
differential workers must "pay" for advance notice provisions can
then be obtained from
k

(4.4) i =log WiA-log WiN =2(ajA-ajN)Xji.
j=i
A simplified variant of the above approach is to assume that all
the coefficients in equations (4.2) and (4.3) are equal except for the
intercept terms. In that case, one may utilize the data for all individ
uals together and estimate
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k

(4.5)

log Wi=

where g; equals one if individual i received advance notice and zero
otherwise. In this case, the estimated wage differential associated
with advance notice does not vary with workers© characteristics (as
in (4.4)), but rather is constant and is given by
(4.6) di =logWiA -logWiN=ak+1 .
It is well known though, that estimates of wage equations from
truncated samples (such as in (4.2) and (4.3)) will not necessarily
yield unbiased estimates of the underlying structural wage equa
tions, since the assumption that the error terms in each equation are
random and uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables is typ
ically violated.4 The problem occurs here because employees and
employers are not randomly assigned to contracts that have advance
notice provisions, but rather make explicit choices. Estimates of the
wage equation that ignore the underlying choice model will be bi
ased because they will confound the effect of an explanatory variable
on wages with its effect on the probability that an individual is em
ployed under a contract calling for advance notice. To adequately
correct for this sample selectivity problem requires a model of the
underlying economic choice process that determines whether an in
dividual is observed working under such a provision. This problem is
complicated by the fact that these provisions are a product of both
employee and employer decisions. We develop such a model below.
Consider first the employee, or union, side of the problem. A
union©s desire to obtain an advance notice clause in a contract is
undoubtedly negatively related to the price ( dj) that it would have to
pay for the provision (in terms of lower wages) and positively related
to its perceptions that a layoff or plant closing might take place and
be costly to its members. Suppose that these perceptions can be rep
resented by a vector of variables, Y, that includes characteristics of
the employees, the employer©s industry, and the labor market in
which the employer is located. For example, older employees, those
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employed in industries where employment is falling, and those who
reside in labor markets with high unemployment rates, might all
have strong preferences to obtain an advance notice provision to aid
their labor market adjustments if a layoff or plant shutdown oc
curred.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the union©s desire to
obtain an advance notice provision is given by
R
r=l

S H =1
if
SH>O
=0 otherwise.
Here V H is a random error term and Sfj is an unobserved variable
that indicates the union©s desire to have an advance notice provision.
Although Sft is not observable, one can arbitrarily scale it so that if
it is greater than zero the union would prefer to have the provision
(S u = 1), while if it is less than or equal to zero the union would
prefer not to have the provision (S H = 0).
Turning next to the employer©s side of the market, an employer©s
willingness to grant an advance notice provision is undoubtedly pos
itively related to the price the union is willing to pay in terms of
lower wages ( dj) to obtain the provision. Similarly, it is also re
lated to the employer©s perception of the other costs and benefits of
the provision to him. For example the provision is likely to be less
costly if there is little danger (in his view) of a shutdown or layoff or
if his employees are skilled workers with good market alternatives
who threaten to quit unless such a provision is included in the con
tract. Suppose his perceptions of these other costs and benefits can
be captured by a vector of variables, Z. Then, again without loss of
generality, we assume that the employer©s willingness to have an ad
vance notice provision is given by
(4.8)

S-YMdi+

m=l

TzAi+Va ,

720 < 0
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S2*>0
if
S2i=l
=0 otherwise.
Once again V2i is an random error term and Sfj is an unobservable variable that indicates the employer©s willingness to have an
advance notice provision in his contract. Again this index can be
arbitrarily scaled so that when it is greater than zero the employer is
willing to have such a provision (S2i = 1), and when it is less than
zero he is not willing (S2i = 0).
Of course the preferences of an employer and a union to have such
a provision can only be partially observed. In particular, all we can
observe in a particular situation is whether a worker is covered by an
advance notice provision. Presumably this occurs only if both the
union and the employer feel that it is in their best interest to have
such a provision (S H = 1 and S2i = 1). It immediately follows that
whether or not an advance notice provision occurs can be represented
by the single binary random variable
(4.9) S3i=S nS2i .
Given "appropriate" assumptions about the distribution of error
terms in (4.2), (4.3), (4.7), and (4.8), the system of equations de
scribed in (4.2) to (4.4) and (4.7) to (4.9) can be estimated and
consistent estimates derived of the wage differentials unions must
pay for advance notice. 5 Appendix B sketches how this may be
done.

Empirical Estimates: Do Workers Pay for Advance Notice?
We begin our empirical analyses by estimating predisplacement
weekly earnings equations for displaced workers, in which we as
sume that advance notice provisions influence only the intercept
terms of the earnings equation (i.e., equation (4.5)). The analyses
were done separately for males and females, and for each gender we
estimated equations for nine groups (entire sample, those on layoff,
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those displaced due to a shutdown, those with job tenure at displace
ment of less than three years, those with job tenure of at least three
years at displacement, and four reason-for-displacement/length-ofjob-tenure groups). Our goal here was to see whether compensating
wage differentials for advance notice arise only for certain subsets of
displaced workers.
Estimates of the coefficients of the advance notice variables (the
ak +i) that we obtained appear in table 4.1. Three equations were es
timated for each group. The coefficients in column A come from
earnings equations that included vectors of personal characteristics,
region and year of displacement dummy variables (to control for
price differentials), and the percentage of employees who were union
members in the three-digit industry in which the individual was em
ployed at the date of displacement. 6 Those in column B come from
equations that included all of the above plus the area (state or
SMSA) unemployment rate, change in the unemployment rate, area
employment growth rate, industry employment growth rate in the
area, and percentage of employees unionized in the area. These latter
variables are all based on knowledge of where respondents resided at
the January 1984 survey date. However, as noted in chapter 3, ap
proximately 18 percent of respondents changed their city or county
of residence between the date they were displaced and the survey
data and thus we may have imputed the wrong "area" variables to
these people©s records. To test for this, the coefficients found in col
umn C come from the same equations as those in column B, with
the samples restricted in column C to those respondents who had not
changed their city or county of residence between the displacement
and survey dates.
These estimates in the main do not provide much support for the
hypothesis that compensating predisplacement wage differentials
arise for the explicit or implicit promise of advance notice. For the
most part, the differentials for males are positive, which is the op
posite of our expectations.7 In contrast, those for females are nega
tive, but only those for females displaced due to a plant closing who
had short job tenure (column A) are statistically significantly differ
ent from zero; in this case they are in the range of 5 to 6 percent. 8
A

Table 4.1
Estimated Wage Differentials Prior to Displacement Associated With Advance Notice: OLS Estimates
(absolute value of /-statistics)

Males
N
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

3749/2803
2251/1686
1497/1116
1925/1352
1823/1450
672/455
663/548
1252/896
740/606

(A)
.027 (1.8)
.032 (1.7)
.019 (0.8)
.042 (2.0)
.004 (0.2)
-.008 (0.8)
.042 (1.3)
.072(2.8)
-.003 (0.1)

Females
(B)
.032
.038
.021
.051
.004
-.004
.033
.080
-.005

(2.2)
(2.0)
(0.9)
(2.4)
(0.2)
(0.1)
(1.0)
(3.0)
(0.0)

(C)

N

(A)

(B)

(C)

.021 (1.3)
.014 (0.7)
.023 (0.9)
.048 (1.9)
-.014 (0.7)
.000 (0.0)
.025 (0.7)
.062 (2.0)
-.034 (1.0)

1981/1604
1036/830
944/773
1095/851
885/752
459/353
379/332
635/497
281/244

-.019 (1.0)
.006 (0.3)
-.050 (1.7)
-.029 (1.1)
-.017 (0.5)
-.067 (1.6)
-.003 (0.1)
-.009 (0.3)
-.030 (0.7)

-.005 (0.3)
.018 (0.7)
-.033 (1.1)
-.006 (0.2)
-.014 (0.5)
-.037 (0.9)
-.003 (0.1)
.023 (0.7)
-.055 (1.0)

-.007 (0.3)
.020 (0.7)
-.037 (1.1)
-.010 (0.4)
-.011 (0.3)
-.081 (0.7)
-.003 (0.1)
.017 (0.5)
-.039 (0.7)

where N = sample size for (A) and (B)/sample size for (C)
Samples (1) entire sample of displaced workers
(6) plant shutdown and job tenure less than 3 years
(2) displaced due to layoff
(7) plant shutdown and job tenure at least 3 years
(3) displaced due to plant closing
(8) layoff and job tenure less than 3 years
(4) job tenure at displacement less than 3 years
(9) plant shutdown and job tenure at least 3 years
(5) job tenure at displacement at least 3 years
and (A) wage equations include vectors of personal characteristics, region and year dummy variables, and the percentage of employees
unionized in the respondent©s 3-digit industry
(B) wage equations include the variables in (A) and SMSA or state unemployment level and change, employment growth, industry
employment growth, and percentage of employees unionized in the area in which the individual resided at the survey date
(C) same as (B) but restricted to individuals who had not changed their city or county of residence between the date of displacement
and the survey date
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Inclusion of the geographic variables and limiting the samples
to nonmovers (columns B and C), however, results in all of the
estimated female differentials becoming statistically insignificantly
different from zero. The magnitudes and signs of the coefficients (in
contrast to their statistical significance) appear to be relatively insen
sitive to the specification used and in what follows we restrict our
attention to the specification in column A.
Might these results be due to our aggregating displaced workers
from all industries together and not controlling adequately for
industry-specific effects on earnings? One crude way to get at this
issue is to reduce the heterogeneity of industries in the sample and
reestimate the model that underlies column A, restricting the sample
to those displaced workers who were employed prior to displacement
in either manufacturing industries or, reducing the heterogeneity still
further, in durable manufacturing industries. This was done and
the resulting coefficients of the advance notice variable appear in
table 4.2. Inspection of these coefficients (they are typically positive
and are never both negative and statistically significantly different
from zero) yields no support for the presence of compensating wage
differentials.
Table 4.2
Estimated Wage Differentials Prior to Displacement Associated With
Advance Notice (Manufacturing and Durable Manufacturing Sample)
OLS Estimates" (absolute value of /-statistics)

Males
N../ND
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

2063/1164
1635/736
1326/427
1392/493
1569/670
1047/148
1132/233
1243/344
1191/297

Mfg.
.026(1.37)
.024 (1.16)
.040 (1.69)
.019 (0.81)
.037 (1.77)
.018 (0.67)
.051 (2.00)
.034 (1.37)
.024 (0.97)

Females
Durable mfg.

N.n/N,,

.014
.023
.019
-.019
.019
-.100
.024
.032
-.008

1346/447
1164/265
1080/181
1109/210
1135/236
962/63
996/97
1045/146
977/78

(0.60)
(0.78)
(0.47)
(0.50)
(0.67)
(1.27)
(0.46)
(0.69)
(0.19)

Mfg.
.026
.043
.021
.034
.029
.033
.032
.042
.040

(1. 18)
(1. 76)
(0. 81)
(1. 34)
(1. 17)
(1. 17)
(1. 20)
(1. 61)
(1. 47)

Durable mfg.
.014 (0.41)
.057 (1.23)
-.027 (0.47)
.013 (0.23)
-.023 (0.49)
-.072 (0.54)
-.060 (0.82)
.051 (0.81)
.050 (0.58)

a. The samples in each row corresponds to those defined in each row of table 4.1. The differ
entials correspond to those found in column (A) of that table.
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Of course, these results may still be due to our failure to control
adequately for industry-specific effects on wages and to our assump
tion (up to this point) that the presence of advance notice provisions
affects only the intercept, not the other coefficients in the earnings
equations. To test for this, we extended our analyses in two ways.
First, separate earnings equations were estimated for the displaced
workers who received advance notice and for those who did not re
ceive notice and then an estimated compensating differential was ob
tained for each individual, as described in the more general model
((4.2) to (4.4)).
Second, an earnings equation was estimated for all employed in
dividuals represented in the May 1979 CPS data using as explana
tory variables the individuals© personal characteristics and a set of
dichotomous variables for the 3-digit industries in which they were
employed. The estimated coefficients of these 200-plus industry
variables, which we shall refer to as the "industry wage differen
tials," are estimates of "unexplained" industry-specific effects
on earnings, and we experimented with including each displaced
worker©s industry wage differential in the predisplacement earnings
equation.
Table 4.3 presents the estimated compensating wage differentials
(equation 4.4) that we obtained when these extensions were under
taken. These were done separately for four groups; males displaced
due to a layoff, females displaced due to a layoff, males displaced
due to a plant shutdown and females displaced due to a shutdown. A
list of the explanatory variables that appear in each question is found
at the bottom of the table. Estimates are presented in the table of the
mean (across individuals) compensating wage differential for ad
vance notice and the minimum and maximum differentials. The
range between the latter two is typically quite large and we discuss
only estimates of the mean differential below.
We focus our attention initially on the rows in the table denoted
w t and w3 for each group. Estimates in these rows are obtained as
described above; the former are based on estimating equations that
include the industry wage differential, while the latter are based on
equations that exclude it. Comparisons of the numbers in the two
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Table 4.3
Estimated Wage Differentials Prior to Displacement Associated
With Advance Notice, Separate Wage Equations by Sector8
Group
Model [Sample size]
Male/Layoff
Wl [2459]
W2 [2330]
W3 [2459]
W4 [2330]
Female/Layoff
Wl [1121]
W2 [1036]
W3 [1121]
W4 [1036]
Male/Shutdown
Wl [1696]
W2 [1629]
W3 [1696]
W4 [1629]
Female/Shutdown
Wl [1028]
W2 [976]
W3 [1028]
W4 [976]

Estimated wage differentials
Mean

Minimum

Maximum

.027
.063
.028
.063

-.396
-.391
-.396
-.391

.513
.714
.514
.741

-.007
-.075
-.007
-.075

-.362
-.584
-.362
-.585

.815
.727
.815
.727

.023
-1.100
.023
-1.100

-.282
-2.145
-.283
-2.145

.836
.117
.837
.118

-.077
-.268
-.078
-.268

-.650
-1.178
-.650
-1.178

.649
.651
.650
.652

where
Wl separate wage equations, no sample selection correction, estimated 3-digit census indus
try wage differential included in each equation
W2 separate wage equations, sample selection correction, estimated industry wage differen
tial included in each equation
W3 same as Wl, but no industry wage differential included
W4 same as W2, but no industry wage differential included
a. All wage equations include personal characteristics (age, age squared, education, education
squared, age-education interaction, tenure prior to displacement, tenure squared, race, marital
status, hispanic status, health insurance status prior to displacement), dummy variables for
Maine and Wisconsin, dummy variables for region and year of displacement, an SMSA
dummy, area (SMSA or state) unemployment and unionization rates, a manufacturing dummy
variable, and the unionization rate nationally in the individual©s 3-digit industry. All variables
refer to the year prior to displacement.
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rows for each group, however, make it clear that industry-specific
effects do not substantially influence the estimated compensating
wage differentials that exist for advance notice.
Quite strikingly, the mean estimated effects are positive for both
male groups; on average, displaced males who received advance no
tice did not "pay" for the notice in the form of lower predisplacement earnings. In contrast, the mean estimated effects are negative
for both female groups. On average, displaced females who received
advance notice also received predisplacement wages that were about
.7 percent (displaced due to layoffs) to 7.7 percent (displaced due to
plant shutdowns) lower than the predisplacement wages of displaced
workers who failed to receive advance notice.
As discussed above, these estimates may still be suspect because
they treat whether displaced workers received advance notice as be
ing random. To control for potential selectivity bias problems, we
attempted to implement the econometric framework described in
(4.7), (4.8) and (4.9) that explicitly modeled employees© demand for
and employers© willingness to provide advance notice provisions.
Unfortunately, this effort proved unsuccessful because to identify the
complete model requires one to specify some variables that enter
into the employees© demand function (4.7) but not the employers©
willingness to supply function (4.8) and vice versa. When one exam
ines the available data on individual, industry, and area variables
(table 3.1), it becomes clear that virtually any of the variables one
might want to use to explain preferences probably enter both the em
ployee and employer side of the market.
As such, we were forced to adopt a simpler approach. Suppose
one is willing to assume that the employer and employee choice of
advance notice rules specified in (4.7) to (4.9) can be approximated
(after substitution ot (4.1) to (4.3) into these equations) by the single
decision rule
(4.10) S4 =

t=i

S4i =l
if
S4i >0
=0 otherwise
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where V4i is a random error term, the Rti are all of the individual,
industry, and area variables that enter either the earnings equations,
the employer willingness to supply advance notice equation, or the
employee demand for advance notice equation, and when S£, is
greater than zero one observes the presence of advance notice
(S4i = 1), otherwise one does not (S4i = 0).
Under suitable assumptions about the distribution of error terms in
(4.2), (4.3), and (4.10), one can obtain consistent estimates of the
earnings equations using a now well-known two-step procedure. 9
Technical details are described in appendix B. Basically this involves
first estimating the reduced form determinants of advance notice
equation (4.10), using estimates of it to compute a variable that con
trols for the probability of observing advance notice, and then esti
mating the earnings equations in each sector with this additional
variable (or a transformation of it) added to correct for "sample se
lection bias."
Our estimates of the determinants of the probability of observing
that a displaced worker received advance notice will be presented
and discussed in the next section. These estimates were used, how
ever, to compute the controls for sample selection bias, and the es
timated wage differentials that arise for advance notice when the
sample selection bias correction method was used are reported in the
rows denoted w2 and w4 of table 4.3.
The estimated mean wage differentials for males and females dis
placed due to a layoff are somewhat larger (in absolute value) than
those obtained before. In contrast, while negative, the estimated av
erage differentials for the males and females who were displaced due
to a plant shutdown are much too large to be considered plausible. 10
We conclude, therefore, that one cannot put too much faith in these
estimates; the ordinary least square estimates reported in rows w }
and w3 are preferable.

Empirical Analysis: The Determinants of Advance Notice
Table 4.4 presents our estimates of the determinants of the proba
bility that each displaced worker in the sample received advance
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Table 4.4
Reduced Form Probit Probability of Advance Notice Coefficients
(absolute value of /-statistics)
Female
Male
Female
Male
Variable/
Shutdown
Shutdown
Layoff
Layoff
Sample
.426 (0.2)
-1.239 (0.9)
2.985 (1.7)
-.561 (0.4)
INTERCEPT
-.751 (2.7)*
-.394 (1.5)
-.535(2.1)*
-.223 (1.0)
IMALE
-2.553 (1.5)
-.127 (0.1)
-1.364 (0.8)
-.175 (0.1)
IBLACK
-8.625 (3.0)*
-.348 (0.1)
-4.809 (1.8)
-2.146(1.0)
WISP
-.017 (0.5)
.006 (0.2)
-.013 (0.4)
.021 (0.8)
IAGE
.006 (0.2)
.014 (0.5)
-.043 (1.3)
-.044 (1.8)
IA55
.103 (1.6)
.054(1.4)
.078 (1.4)
-.020 (0.6)
ITEN
.013 (1.1)
.004 (0.3)
.020 (1.9)
.020 (2.3)*
ICOL
.001 (0.0)
.008 (0.7)
-.004 (0.3)
-.001 (0.1)
ms
-.013 (1.5)
-.005 (0.7)
-.013 (1.6)
-.002 (0.2)
IPROF
-.011 (1.4)
-.011 (1.7)
-.005 (0.6)
-.004 (0.8)
IADS
.004 (0.8)
.004(1.2)
.007 (1.4)
.007 (2.5)*
mcs
.005 (0.3)
-.022 (1.7)
-.041 (2.2)*
-.006 (0.5)
mcu
-.002 (0.6)
.001 (0.3)
.004 (0.9)
.005 (2.1)*
IUNION
-.111 (0.8)
-.137 (1.4)
-.197(1.5)
-.038 (0.5)
MANUF
.005 (0.1)
.006 (0.2)
.049 (1.6)
-.038 (1.9)
AUNEMP
.002 (0.3)
.025 (0.6)
.118 (2.5)*
.037 (1.2)
AUNEMPC
.732 (0.2)
.392 (0.2)
-4.158 (1.2)
-1.087 (0.6)
AEMPC1
1.053 (0.8)
-.370 (0.2)
1.405 (0.9)
-.982 (0.8)
AEMPC2
-1.928 (0.8)
-.373 (0.3)
5.485 (2.2)
-.466 (0.5)
AEMPC3
.074(0.1)
-.336 (0.5)
-1.769 (1.8)
-.067 (0.1)
AEMPC4
.002 (0.2)
-.011 (1.7)
-.021 (2.5)*
.007 (1.3)
AUNION
.129(1.3)
-.074 (1.0)
.159(1.7)
.117 (2.0)*
MSMSA
-.594 (0.7)
.527 (1.3)
.398 (1.0)
-.081 (0.4)
YD1
-.707 (0.8)
.613 (1.5)
.172(0.5)
-.731 (0.3)
YD2
-.471 (0.6)
.623 (1.5)
-.062 (0.2)
-.291 (1.4)
YDS
-.410 (0.5)
.547 (1.4)
-.012 (0.1)
-.165 (0.8)
YD4
-.408 (0.5)
.461 (1.1)
-.075 (0.2)
-.180(0.9)
YDS
.328 (2.1)*
-.078 (0.7)
.025 (0.2)
Rl
-.111(1.1)
.147 (1.1)
-.018 (0.1)
-.108(0.8)
-.149(1.8)
R2
(0.7)
-.105
(0.9)
-.098
-.272 (1.9)
-.073 (0.9)
R3
(0.5)
.015
(0.1)
-.003
-.032 (1.0)
-.002(0.1)
AGET
.001 (0.8)
.000(1.1)
.000(0.1)
.000 (0.7)
AGET2
(0.9)
.185 (1.2)
.072
(1.1)
-.143
(0.8)
.067
REDUC
(0.6)
-.003
.000(0.1)
(0.7)
.002
(0.8)
-.002
REDUC2
(1.6)
(1.8)
-.002
-.002
.002(1.1)
(0.5)
-.001
AGEED
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Table 4.4 (Continued)
Female
Male
Shutdown
Layoff

Variable/
Sample

Male
Layoff

TENURE
TEN2
RRACE
RHISP
RMAR
RVET
RHINST
MAINE

.020(1.5)
-.001 (1.4)
-.019 (0.2)
-.089 (0.7)
.024 (0.4)
-.051 (0.8)
.053 (0.9)
.042 (0.2)
-.064 (0.3)
-.089 (0.3)
1186
1144
65.62 (45)

wise
WDIF
RADV = 0
RADV = 1
X2(DOF)

.043
-.002
-.001
.281
.042

(1.9)
(1.9)
(0.1)
(1.4)
(0.5)

.262
-.015
.371
-.037

(2.8)*
(0.1)
(1.3)
(0.9)

562
474
85.81 (44)

.029 (2.3)*
-.006 (1.6)
-.205 (1.9)
-.017(0.1)
-.089 (1.2)
-.014 (0.2)
.172(2.3)*
.397 (1.2)
.121 (0.4)
-.975 (2.5)*
737
892
74.19(45)
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Female
Shutdown
.032 (1.7)
-.002 (1.9)
.200(1.4)
-.182(0.9)
.185 (2.1)*
.252 (2.7)*
-.486 (1.3)
.063 (0.2)
.295 (0.6)
401
575
87.23 (44)

©Coefficients statistically significantly different from zero at .05 level; two-tail test.
See table 3.1 for all variable definitions.

notice of his or her displacement. The probability is assumed to de
pend upon characteristics of the individual, characteristics of the
workforce in the industry the individual was displaced from, and la
bor market characteristics in the area (state or SMSA) in which the
individual resided at the time of displacement. These equations are
best interpreted as approximations to the process that generates ad
vance notice, each variable enters these equations either because it
influences employer preferences, employee preferences, or predisplacement earnings. If the error term in these probability equations
is assumed to be normally distributed, they become the familiar probit model.
Definitions of all the variables included in the analysis are found
in table 3.1. The industry level variables (which start with the letter
"I") represent the demographic and occupational composition of
employees in the industry, as well as the percent unionization in the
industry and whether the industry is in manufacturing. The area
(state or SMSA) characteristics (which start with the letter "A")
include recent unemployment rate levels and changes and recent
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employment changes; the latter two variables are both for the entire
area and the industry in which the individual was employed in the
area. Region (R) and year (YD) dummy variables are also included.
Finally, a host of characteristics of the individual displaced workers
are included; among these are dummy variables that indicate
whether an individual was employed prior to displacement in Maine
or Wisconsin the two states that had mandatory advance notice
legislation "on the books" during the 1979-83 period.
Separate analyses are reported in the table for four gender/reasonfor-displacement groups. In each case, a chi-square test indicates that
one can reject the hypothesis that these models have no explanatory
power. Many of the explanatory variables are highly correlated with
one another and therefore most of the coefficients of the individual
variables are statistically insignificantly different from zero. Our pri
mary interest in these equations is whether or not one can predict the
presence of advance notice, so in a "reduced form" sense the esti
mation is successful. While in general one cannot separately identify
many specific important determinants of advance notice, three par
ticular results found near the bottom of the table do stand out. 11
First, prior coverage by an employer-provided health insurance
plan (RHINST) increases the probability of receiving advance notice.
This undoubtedly reflects union bargaining power and/or the correla
tion of "good" contract provisions across employers. Second, dis
placed workers in Maine and Wisconsin were not significantly more
(or less) likely to receive advance notice than displaced workers in
other states; apparently, at least during the 1979-83 period, laws re
quiring advance notice in these states did not have a large impact.
Finally, industries in which the industry wage premium (WDIF) was
high were less likely to provide their displaced workers with advance
notice, at least for male workers displaced due to shutdowns.

Concluding Remarks
In a sense, our findings in this chapter are somewhat negative
ones. We found very little evidence to support the view that dis-
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placed workers who received advance notice had to pay for it in the
form of lower predisplacement wages when ordinary least squares
were used. Hence, analyses of the effect of advance notice on postdisplacement earnings and durations of nonemployment can probably
safely ignore this possibility. Such compensating wage differentials
may have existed for some groups of displaced females, but the mag
nitudes were very small and we have no ready explanation for why
only this group©s wages would be affected.
Our attempts to explain which displaced workers received advance
notice also did not meet with much success. While one can reject the
hypothesis that the models we estimated had no explanatory power,
very few of the large number of individual, industry and area explan
atory variables used were shown individually to have statistically
significant effects. Moreover, when we used the estimates of the de
terminants of advance notice to try to correct for sample selection
bias in the estimation of the predisplacement wage equations, im
plausibly large wage differentials were estimated for males and fe
males displaced due to plant shutdowns. Thus we are skeptical of our
ability to use the estimates obtained here to control for the endogeneity of advance notice in the duration of nonemployment and postdisplacement wage equations estimated in the next two chapters. As
the reader shall see, such skepticism is justified.

NOTES
1. See Ehrenberg and Schumann (1982) for evidence that unions win positive compensating
wage differentials for distasteful mandatory overtime provisions and Dickens (1984) for evi
dence that similar compensating differentials for on-the-job injury risk exist in the union sec
tor.
2. A numerical example should make this point clear. Suppose two equally skilled workers
were displaced. One, working for an employer who did not provide advance notice, was earn
ing $10.00/hour, while the second, working for an employer who did provide advance notice,
received $9.75/hour. The difference is the assumed compensating wage differential for advance
notice. Suppose further that they both wind up in $9.00/hour jobs (i.e., advance notice has no
effect). The worker with notice would appear to have a smaller wage loss ($.75/hour rather
than $1.00/hour). However, this would reflect only that part of his predisplacement compen
sation was in the form of a promise of advance notice in this example notice was assumed to
have no effect on postdisplacement earnings.
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3. For expository convenience, we focus on the union sector in what follows. Similar logic
can be used to discuss the nonunion sector if one treats advance notice as an implicit contract
provision.
4. See Heckman (1979) for a detailed discussion of this point.
5. If the error terms in (4.7) and (4.8) are jointly normally distributed, the model in (4.7)(4.9) is called the truncated bivariate probit model; this model was first discussed by Poirer
(1980).
6. The personal characteristics variables include age, age squared, education, education
squared, tenure with the employer prior to displacement, tenure squared, race, marital status,
hispanic status, and coverage by health insurance status prior to displacement.
7. We must caution here that the SOW did not contain data on the respondents© union status
as of the date of displacement. If union status is an omitted variable that (a) leads to higher
wages and (b) is correlated with the presence of advance notice, the advance notice coeffi
cients will be biased in a positive direction. While we attempted to control for union status in
the earnings equations by including the percentage of employees unionized in each respon
dent©s area and industry, these controls may not be adequate.
8. In other studies, for example, Ehrenberg and Schumann (1982), compensating wage dif
ferentials are seen to arise only for workers with short job tenure.
9. See Heckman (1979).
10. Since dj = log w,A - log w, N , the estimated percentage wage differential workers must
pay for advance notice is given by w, A-w, N = (exp(di)-l)*100. Since the sample selection
correction estimate of d\ is -1.1 for males displaced due to a plant shutdown, the estimated
percentage predisplacement wage reduction associated with advance notice is (exp(I. !)-!)* 100 or -67 percent. It is simply implausible that workers would accept a wage cut of
2/3 in return for a promise of advance notice if they were displaced. Similarly, the dj of -.268
for females displaced due to a plant shutdown implies that the estimated percentage predis
placement wage reduction associated with the promise of advance notice is (exp(.268)-!)* 100 or -23 percent. Even this figure seems implausibly high.
II. By restricting the set of explanatory variables, it is possible to estimate advance notice
equations in which most coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero. The
results reported in subsequent chapters are insensitive to such restrictions and the more inclu
sive specifications reported in table 4.4 are preferred for the compensating differential analy
ses reported in this chapter.

Advance Notice and
Nonemployment Duration

Table 5.1 presents background data on the durations of nonemployment that displaced workers in the 1984 SOW experienced be
tween their displacement dates and the January 1984 survey date.
These data were reported by complete weeks of nonemployment, and
the top row of the table, 0 weeks, refers to individuals who had
either no nonemployment or a spell that lasted less than one week.
Quite strikingly, 7 to 8 percent of the displaced workers who were
laid off reported 0 weeks and 12 to 14.5 percent of those displaced
due to a plant shutdown also reported 0 weeks. Moreover, in each
gender/reason-for-displacement group for whom data are tabulated in
table 5.1, a greater percentage of the workers who received advance
notice reported 0 weeks than did the workers who failed to receive
notice.
Do these results imply that advance notice increases the probabil
ity that a displaced worker will suffer no spell of nonemployment?
Or do they simply mean that workers who receive advance notice are
more likely to have skills that make them rapidly employable or are
more likely to reside in areas where there are better job opportuni
ties? The following section addresses these questions.
The remaining rows of table 5.1 report the distribution of weeks
of nonemployment for displaced workers who had durations of at
least one week. Individuals reported all durations of 99 weeks or
more as 99 in the SOW and, depending upon the gender/reason-fordisplacement group, 8.5 to 14.7 percent of the displaced workers fell
in this category. If one treats these people as having durations of 99
weeks, one can compute lower bound estimates of the mean dura
tions of nonemployment experienced for each group. This ranges
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Table 5.1
Distributions of Durations of Nonemployment in the January 1984 CPS Displaced Worker Sample
Percentages
Female
Male
Female
Male
Shutdown
Shutdown
Layoff
Layoff
Number
(A)
(All)
(N)
(A)
(All)
(N)
(A)
(All)
(N)
(A)
(All)
of weeks
13.7
12.1
10.3
18.0
14.5
6.3
9.6
7.8
5.6
8.8
7.2
0
1-13
14-26
27-39
40-52
53-78
79-98
>99

38.7
17.4
8.3
10.2
7.7
1.4
9.2

Mean duration
reported
Sample size

29.3
2481

37.2
17.3
8.0
9.7
7.1
1.5
10.4

40.2
17.5
8.5
10.8
8.2
1.3
8.0

31.7
17.3
7.7
10.5
8.8
1.4
14.7

29.8
17.6
8.8
9.8
8.1
0.9
15.4

33.2
17.0
6.8
11.2
9.4
1.8
14.2

1249

1138

33.8
14.4
7.0
9.2
7.1
1.5
9.0

39.0
18.8
6.4
10.0
6.0
1.7
7.8

533

605

1699

34.3
14.6
7.4
10.0
5.6
1.7
14.2

9.7

33.7
13.3
8.3
10.3
5.9
2.5
12.3

35.2
16.5
6.1
9.5
5.2
0.7
17.0

611

423

31.9

26.9

35.0
1232

36.1
16.4
6.7
9.6
6.6
1.6
8.5

(N)

932

707

1034

SOURCE: Authors© computations from the January 1984 CPS Displaced Worker Supplement sample used in the analyses. Mean duration calculations
treat 99 (greater than or equal to 99) as 99.
(A11)-A11 displaced workers; (A)-displaced workers with advance notice; (N)-displaced workers without notice.
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from 26.9 weeks for males displaced due to plant shutdowns to 35.0
weeks for females displaced due to layoffs. Visual comparisons of
the distributions for the workers who received and those who failed
to receive advance notice do not suggest any obvious differences be
tween the two groups. Such comparisons do not control for any dif
ferences in other variables between the groups, and this chapter will
address what the effects of advance notice on duration of nonemployment (given that duration was positive) were, after one controls
for other factors expected to influence duration.
If advance notice increases the probability that a displaced worker
will experience no spell of nonemployment, it does so because it
permits search for new employment prior to displacement. If soonto-be-displaced workers are successful in this endeavor, they are apt
to quit their jobs prior to the planned displacement date. Among the
arguments that opponents of advance notice legislation put forth is
that notice of impending displacement would encourage a firm©s
most productive workers, who may well be those with the best al
ternative employment opportunities, to quit their jobs prior to the
planned displacement date. Thus, it is argued, the demise of firms
that already are in serious trouble would be hastened.
While creative approaches can be devised to minimize the chances
this would happen, such as providing severance pay only to workers
who are still employed as of the shutdown or layoff date, critics of
advance notice still stress this point. Hence, knowledge of which
displaced workers would actually leave after being given advance no
tice prior to displacement is important for the policy debate. This
chapter also addresses this issue.
Advance Notice and the Probability of Observing
a Positive Duration of Nonemployment
What determines whether a displaced worker suffers a positive du
ration of nonemployment? On the one hand, personal characteris
tics of the worker are likely to matter. For example, skilled workers
may typically have an easier time finding work than nonskilled
workers. On the other hand, characteristics of the labor market, such
as the area unemployment rate, will determine the worker©s success
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at quickly finding work. Finally, to the extent that advance notice
permits the worker to search for work prior to the date of displace
ment and/or if it is accompanied by other services that facilitate job
matching, advance notice should also matter.
These ideas are captured in table 5.2, which presents the results of
the estimation of probit probability of experiencing positive duration
of nonemployment equations for the displaced workers in the SOW. ©
The personal characteristics of the workers included in the model are
marital status (RMAR), race (RRACE), age at the displacement date
and its square (AGET, AGET2), veteran status (RVET), years of
schooling (REDUC), whether the worker is Hispanic (RHISP), years
of job tenure with the employer prior to displacement and its square
(TEN, TEN2) and whether the worker was covered by health in
surance (RHINST), was a white-collar worker (WCOL), or was em
ployed in manufacturing (MANUF). Year of displacement (YD) and
region of employment at displacement (R) dummy variables are in
cluded to partially control for economic conditions the worker may
have faced. Area-(state or SMSA) specific variables included are the
area unemployment rate in the year of displacement (AU), the per
centage of the area©s workforce that was unionized (AUNION), and
whether the individual resided in an SMSA (MSMSA). Finally, a
variable indicating the receipt of advance notice (RADV, 1 = yes,
0 = no) is included.
These equations were estimated separately for males displaced due
to layoffs, females displaced due to layoffs, males displaced due to
plant shutdowns and females displaced due to plant shutdowns. For
all four groups, chi-square statistics reported at the bottom of the
table suggest that one cannot reject the hypothesis that these equa
tions have significant explanatory power and at least some of the vari
ables have statistically significant nonzero coefficients in each equa
tion. For example, as one might expect, other things equal, in all
four groups nonwhites had a higher probability of experiencing a
spell of nonemployment than did whites (perhaps due to discrimina
tory factors) and more highly educated workers had a lower proba
bility than less highly educated workers. Similarly, workersdisplaced
from manufacturing had a higher probability than did other workers.
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Table 5.2
Probit Probability of Positive Duration of Nonemployment
Equations for Displaced Workers
(absolute value f-statistics)
Female
Male
Female
Male
Shutdown
Shutdown
Variable/Group
Layoff
Layoff
4.117(1.0)
.183(1.2)
.388 (2.1)
.006(0.1)
-.000 (0.4)

-.061 (2.2)
.791 (1.8)
-.233 (1.7)
.781 (1.7)
.881 (2.0)
.727 (1.7)
.842 (2.0)
.842 (2.0)
-.034 (0.7)
.003 (1.0)
.227 (1.1)
-.020(0.1)
-.153(0.8)
.047 (0.3)
.309 (2.3)
.047 (1.2)
-.010 (0.9)
-.098 (0.8)
-.235 (2.0)

1.102(1.5)
-.216 (2.2)
.302(1.9)
-.009 (0.3)
-.000 (0.6)
.060 (0.6)
-.058 (3.0)
.194(1.0)
.015 (0.1)
.096 (0.2)
.274 (0.6)
.532(1.1)
.584(1.2)
.584(1.2)
-.005 (0.3)
.000 (0.6)
-.127(1.0)
.001 (0.6)
.255 (2.0)
-.129(1.3)
.203 (3.2)
-.002 (0.1)
.023 (3.1)
-.076 (0.8)
-.381 (4.5)

-.082 (3.0)
.313(1.1)
.093 (0.8)
-2.663 (0.6)
-2.595(0.6)
-2.451 (0.6)
-2.363 (0.6)
-2.439 (0.6)
-.004(0.1)
-.000(0.1)
.206(1.2)
.204 (1.4)
.064 (0.4)
.012(0.1)
.172 (1.5)
-.015 (0.4)
.011 (1.1)
.221 (2.0)
-.167(1.5)

94
969
51.804 (23)

249
1299
109.427 (24)

135
794
38.074 (23)

INTERCEPT
RMAR
RRACE
AGET
AGET2
RVET
REDUC
RHISP
RHINST
YD1
YD2
YD3
YD4
YDS
TENURE
TEN2
Rl
R2
R3
WCOL
MANUF
AU
AUNION
MSMSA
RADV

1.891 (3.0)
-.149(0.1)
.309 (2.2)
-.011 (0.3)
.000 (0.4)
-.037 (0.4)
-.086 (4.7)
-.216(1.3)
.043 (0.5)
.577 (2.1)
.352(1.4)
.367 (1.5)
.593 (2.5)
.515 (2.2)
-.029 (1.6)
.001 (0.6)
.165 (1.3)
.105 (1.0)
.139(1.2)
.128 (1.3)
.062 (0.7)
.024(1.1)
.006 (0.9)
.005 (0.1)
-.144(1.9)

2.612 (2.9)
-.005(0.1)
.524 (2.7)
-.071 (1.5)
.001 (1.4)

DUR = 0
DUR>0
X2(DOF)

204
2146
68.107(24)

See table 3.1 for variable definitions and sources.

Most important, receipt of advance notice is seen to have reduced
the probability of experiencing a positive length spell of nonemployment for all groups. Moreover, this relationship is statistically signif
icantly different from zero for three of the four groups.
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Several extensions were conducted to see how robust these results
concerning the effects of advance notice are; these extensions are
summarized in table 5.3. The first row simply reproduces the RADV
coefficients from table 5.2. The second row presents the estimated
effects of advance notice when the model in table 5.2 was reestimated with an instrument, RADV (obtained from the reduced form
probability of advance notice equations in table 4.4) used in place of
RADV. When the instrument was used, its coefficients suggested
that advance notice did not appear to significantly influence the
probability that the displaced workers experienced a nonzero spell
length. While the instrument should be preferred if one is concerned
about the endogeneity of advance notice, the lack of statistically sig
nificant coefficients in table 4.4, reduces our confidence that it is at
all meaningful. Formal statistical tests reported in the next section
and appendix B suggest that it is legitimate for us to treat advance
notice as exogenous.
Table 5.3
Comparison of Coefficients of Advance Notice Variable in Probit Probability
of Positive Duration of Nonemployment Equations: Various Specifications
(absolute value /-statistics)
Male
Layoff

Female
Layoff

Male
Shutdown

Female
Shutdown

(1) RADV

-.144(1.9)

-.235 (2.0)

-.381 (4.5)

-.167 (1.5)

(2) RADV

.066(0.1)

.234 (0.7)

1.067 (1.5)

.563 (0.9)

(3) RADV
RADV*T

-.117 (1.3)
-.080 (0.6)

-.220(1.7)
-.073 (0.3)

-.420 (4.2)
.098 (0.7)

-.169(1.4)
.005 (0.0)

(4) RADV
RADV*WC

-.047 (0.5)
-.372(2.1)

-.184(1.0)
-.095 (0.4)

-.208 (2.1)
-.512 (2.9)

-.219 (1.3)
.098 (0.5)

Model/Group

where
(1) specification in table 5.2, RADV treated as exogenous,
(2) specification in table 5.2, instrument for RADV used which was obtained from the re
duced form probability of advance notice equation,
(3) same as (1), but RADV is also interacted with whether the individual had at least 3 years
tenure on the job prior to displacement (T = 1, otherwise T = 0),
(4) same as (1), but RADV is also interacted with whether the individual was a white-collar
employee prior to displacement (WC = 1, otherwise WC = 0).
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The third row reports the results of experiments that allow the
affect of advance notice to depend on whether individuals had at
least three years of job tenure prior to their displacement. As is ev
ident, the marginal effect of advance notice on the probability of
experiencing a positive spell length did not depend on workers© prior
tenure. When similar experiments were conducted to see if the ef
fects differed for white-collar and blue-collar workers (row 4), the
answer appears to be yes, at least for males. Advance notice appears
to have reduced the probability that males who were displaced due to
either layoffs or plant shutdowns experienced nonzero durations of
nonemployment by more for white-collar workers than it did for
blue-collar workers.
Some idea of the magnitude of these effects can be found in table
5.4. The underlying probit coefficient estimates and the values of the
explanatory variables for each displaced worker can be used to com
pute what his or her expected probability of experiencing a positive
duration of nonemployment would be, both with and without ad
vance notice. 2 The difference between these two probabilities is our
estimate of the effect of advance notice on that individual©s nonem
ployment duration. The average effect over all individuals is found in
the column headed "Mean." These calculations are presented for all
workers, and separately for blue-collar and white-collar workers; in
the latter case, the coefficient estimates that underlie row 4 of table
5.3 are used.
One can interpret the numbers in table 5.4 as follows: Males dis
placed due to a layoff who received advance notice had, on average,
a probability of experiencing a nonzero spell length that was .022
lower than that of otherwise comparable individuals in the group
who failed to receive notice. This number should be contrasted to
the overall probability of having a zero spell length of .087 for the
group. 3 The analogous pairs of numbers for females on layoff (-.035,
.088), males displaced due to a shutdown (-.084, .161), and females
displaced due to a shutdown (-.043, .145) are roughly of the same
order of magnitude. Given that roughly 60 percent of the displaced
workers in the sample actually received advance notice, elimination
of advance notice would have decreased the proportion of displaced
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Table 5.4
Marginal Effect of Having Had Advance Notice on the Probability of a
Displaced Worker's Having a Positive Duration of Nonemployment
Computed effects by individual

Male Layoff [.087]
All workers"
White-collar*
Blue-collar
Female Layoff [.088]
All workers8
White-collar0
Blue-collar"
Male Shutdown [.161]
All workers"
White-collar"
Blue-collar*
Female Shutdown [.145]
All workers
White-collar
Blue-collar

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

-.022
-.055
-.007

.099
.024
.003

-.0009
-.0020
-.0003

-.054
-.152
-.018

-.035
-.041
-.028

.018
.021
.014

-.0004
-.0004
-.0003

-.086
-.101
-.068

-.084
-.165
-.045

.030
.053
.016

-.007
-.017
-.004

-.151
-.281
-.083

-.043
-.026
-.048

.014
.009
.016

-.0002
-.0001
-.0002

-.080
-.048
-.088

[ ] fraction in the group who had zero durations of nonemployment.
a. Based on RADV coefficient that was statistically significantly different from zero at at
least the . 10 level; two-tail test.

workers observed to have zero duration of nonemployment by
roughly 15 to 30 percent.4 Moreover, as table 5.4 indicates, the ef
fect of advance notice on this probability for males is roughly twice
as large for white-collar workers as it is for blue-collar workers.
Advance Notice and Displaced Workers'
Durations of Nonemployment
The evidence presented in the previous section suggests that dis
placed workers who received advance notice had lower probabilities
of experiencing a positive length spell of nonemployment than dis
placed workers who failed to receive notice. In this section we focus
on workers who experienced positive spell lengths and ask what the
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effect of having had advance notice was on these workers© durations
of nonemployment. 5
Table 5.5 presents estimates of equations in which the logarithm
of the displaced workers© durations of nonemployment were speci
fied to be functions of the same set of variables that entered into the
previous section©s probability of positive duration equations. The
econometric method used here takes account of the fact that the SOW
questionnaire did not permit individuals to report durations of more
than 99 weeks and that some displaced workers© durations of nonem
ployment were truncated because they were still in progress at the
survey date.6 Although the sample is confined to those workers with
positive durations, no econometric correction has been made here
for any potential sample selection bias that may arise. We address
this issue later in the section. The method used here assumes an
exponential distribution for the error terms; we also illustrate the
sensitivity of the results to this assumption below.
Numerous variables in this table are seen to be important deter
minants of duration of nonemployment. For example, other things
equal, nonwhites (RRACE) had longer durations, while highly edu
cated workers (REDUC) and white-collar workers (WOOL) had
shorter durations in all four gender/reason-for-unemployment groups.
Area labor market conditions also mattered; for three of the four
groups, the higher the area unemployment rate was the longer dis
placed workers© durations of nonemployment were. Most important
to us, however, is that, conditional on a positive duration having oc
curred, receipt of advance notice did not significantly reduce these
displaced workers© durations of nonemployment.
How sensitive is this latter result to various assumptions we have
made? Table 5.6 presents comparisons of how the coefficient of the
advance notice variables in the log duration equations changed when
a number of the assumptions were altered. First, for each of the four
gender/reason-for-displacement groups, we reestimated the duration
equations using alternative assumptions about the distribution of er
ror terms. In particular, in addition to the exponential distribution,
we used the gamma and lognormal distributions. 7 Second, we used
the instrument for the receipt of advance notice variable obtained
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Table 5.5
Logarithm of Duration of Nonemployment Equations for Displaced Workers
With Positive Durations of Nonemployment: Exponential Error Distribution
(standard error)
Female
Shutdown

Male
Layoff

Female
Layoff

Male
Shutdown

INTERCEPT
RMAR
RRACE
AGET
AGET2
RVET
REDUC
RHISP
RHINST
YD1
YD2
YDS
YD4
YDS
TENURE
TEN2
Rl
R2
R3
WCOL
MANUF
AU
AUNION
MSMSA
RADV

.786 (.493)
-.361 (.061)
.682 (.098)
.034 (.023)
-.024 (.033)
.026 (.067)
-.072 (.013)
.100 (.131)
.064 (.063)
2. 177 (.284)
2.105 (.280)
2.113 (.270)
2. 150 (.266)
1.663 (.266)
.057 (.014)
-.002 (.001)
.124 (.090)
.424 (.075)
.268 (.081)
-.255 (.068)
-.004 (.059)
.053 (.018)
.019 (.055)
.074 (.060)
.055 (.055)

2.511 (.725)
.079 (.087)
.856 (.133)
.017 (.032)
-.003 (.048)
-.063 (.021)
.275 (.190)
-.130 (.093)
1.399 (.449)
1.008 (.443)
1.233 (.426)
1.009 (.418)
.459 (.410)
.034 (.029)
-.001 (.002)
.326 (.132)
.595 (.120)
.349 (.129)
-.266 (.095)
-.077 (.094)
.001 (.026)
.014 (.008)
.203 (.092)
.048 (.085)

.111 (.663)
-.323 (.079)
.445 (.120)
.036 (.026)
-.040 (.038)
.255 (.079)
-.084 (.015)
-.136 (.147)
.138 (.076)
2.886 (.467)
2.690 (.466)
2.948 (.461)
2.894 (.458)
2.362 (.458)
.033 (.015)
-.001 (.001)
.100 (.113)
.191 (.095)
-.011 (.095)
-.257 (.081)
.063 (.074)
.042 (.022)
.024 (.006)
.167 (.073)
.053 (.067)

-.085 (.023)
.317 (.210)
.028 (.095)
3. 196 (.739)
2.886 (.740)
3.082 (.730)
2.695 (.725)
2. 103 (.723)
.042 (.023)
-.001 (.001)
-.024 (.133)
.316 (.125)
.229 (.136)
-.197 (.095)
.136 (.099)
.087 (.029)
.002 (.007)
-.004 (.101)
-.030 (.089)

Loglikelihood
DUR < 99
DUR > 99

-2915.74
1390
756

-1324.94
593
376

-1931.26
933
366

-1175.7
558
236

Variable/Group

.327
.182
.739
.023
-.012

(.969)
(.092)
(.155)
(.032)
(.047)

a. Coefficient and standard error have been multiplied by 100.

from the reduced form probit equation in chapter 4 to control for the
possible endogeneity of advance notice. Third, we reestimated the
log duration equations to see if the impact of having had advance
notice depended on the displaced workers© previous job tenure.
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Perusal of table 5.6 suggests that the following conclusions may
be drawn from these extensions. First, the conclusion that, having
advance notice does not affect displaced workers© durations of nonemployment, given that duration of nonemployment is positive, is
robust, and was not sensitive to which of the distributions was as
sumed (row 1). Second, when the instrument for advance notice was
used, its coefficients implied that receipt of advance notice actually
lengthened displaced workers© durations of nonemployment for three
of the four groups (row 2). However, the implied marginal effects
were so large here that all one can really conclude is that the instru
ment is picking up something spurious. 8 Moreover, formal statistical
tests described in appendix B suggest that since it is legitimate to
treat advance notice as exogenous, the instrument is not needed. Fi
nally, when the effect of advance notice is allowed to vary with pre
vious job tenure (row 3), it appears that for at least one group,
females displaced due to a layoff who had at least three years prior
tenure, advance notice may have reduced nonemployment durations.
However, this effect was statistically significant for only one error
distribution assumption.
Two final extensions warrant brief mention before we conclude
this section. Table 5.7 shows what the coefficients on a (1,0) re
ceived unemployment insurance (UI) variable was when it was added
to the log duration of nonemployment equation for displaced workers
with positive durations of nonemployment. Even when we confine
the sample to those whose durations are greater than one week (to
avoid a spurious correlation due to people with short durations not
receiving UI because of the waiting week that exists in most states)
and to those whose predisplacement job tenure was at least one year
(to assure that they were all eligible for UI), we still find that dis
placed workers who received UI did have longer durations of nonemployment as theory predicts.
Finally, table 5.8 tests whether our failure so far to control for the
fact that we have restricted our sample to those with positive dura
tions of nonemployment has led to a sample selection bias problem.
Row (1) in this table merely repeats the advance notice variable©s
coefficients from table 5.5. Row (2) shows that ignoring both the

Table 5.6
Comparison of Advance Notice Coefficients in Logarithm of Duration of Nonemployment Equations
Various Specifications
Female Layoff

Male Layoff

Group

Male Shutdown

Model/Dist.

(E)

(G)

(L)

(E)

(G)

(L)

(E)

(1) RADV

.054

.028

.019

.077

.079

.053

(2) RADV

1.288*

1.291*

1.340*

.048
.902**

.824

.809

1.479*

.052
.010

.022
.017

.016
.009

(3) RADV
RADV*T

.117
-.342*

.141
.141
-.286 -.274

.041
.030

(G)

(L)

Female Shutdown
(E)

(G)

(L)

-.020 -.025 -.031 -.061 -.058
1.126

1.078 -.411

-.188 -.190

-.046 -.050 -.072 -.096 -.095
.116
.110
.060 .140
.063

where
(1) specification in table 5.5, RADV treated as exogenous,
(2) specification in table 5.5, instrument for RADV used which was obtained from the reduced form probability of advance notice equation,
(3) same as (1), but RADV is also interacted with whether the individual had at least 3 years of tenure on the job prior to displacement (T = 1,
otherwise T = 0),
and the distribution of error terms is assumed to be
(E) exponentially distribution,
(G) gamma distribution,
(L) lognormal distribution.
*(**) Coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero at the .05 level; two-tail test.
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Table 5.7
Effect of Receipt of Unemployment Insurance on
Logarithm of Duration of Nonemployment
(standard error)

Model
(1)
(2)
(3)

Male
Layoff
.821 (.072)
.542 (.071)
.635 (.101)

Female
Layoff
.808 (.112)
.587 (.110)
.902 (.176)

Male
Shutdown
.971 (.087)
.753 (.086)
.711 (.114)

Female
Shutdown
.501 (.116)
.356 (.112)
.410 (.149)

where
(1) same specification is in table 5.5, but (1,0) receive unemployment insurance when dis
placed variable added,
(2) same as (1), but restricted to people whose duration of nonemployment exceeded one
week,
(3) same as (2), but further restricted to people whose predisplacement job tenure exceeded
one year.

truncation of duration at 99 weeks and that some spells were still in
progress at the survey data does not substantially alter the estimated
advance notice variable©s coefficient in most cases. Finally, row
(3) shows that use of Heckman©s (1979) two-stage procedure to con
trol for the exclusion of displaced workers with zero weeks of
Table 5.8
Testing for Sample Selection Bias in the Log
Durations of Nonemployment Equations
Coefficients of advance notice variable

(1)
(2)
(3)

Male
Layoff

Female
Layoff

Male
Shutdown

Female
Shutdown

.055
-.001
-.050

.048
.082
.130

.053
.033
-.013

-.130
-.034
-.067

where
(1) specification in table S.S, exponential error distribution, takes account of truncation at 99
weeks and of spells in progress,
(2) specification in table S.S, normal error distributions, OLS,
(3) specification in table S.S, normal error distribution, inverse Mills ratio correction factor
to control for exclusion of displaced workers with zero weeks of nonemployment.
*(**) Coefficient statistically significantly different from zero at .OS (.10) level; two-tail test.
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nonemployment similarly does not substantially alter the results. Put
another way, there is no evidence here that receipt of advance no
tice significantly reduced displaced workers© durations of nonem
ployment for those displaced workers with positive durations of
nonemployment.

Does Advance Notice Cause a Firm's Most Productive
Workers to Quit Prior to Displacement?
The January 1984 SOW asked displaced workers who had received
advance notice if they subsequently quit their jobs prior to the
planned displacement date. The bottom two rows of table 5.9 tabu
late the number of people with advance notice in each of our four
gender/reason-for-displacement groups who quit prior to displace
ment (Quit =1) and who remained employed until the displacement
date (Quit = 0). Depending upon the group, these estimates imply
that between 9.3 and 16.3 percent of those people who received ad
vance notice quit prior to their displacement.
What are the factors that influence whether a worker quits prior to
displacement? Table 5.9 also presents estimates of probit probability
of quit prior to displacement equations for full-time workers who
received advance notice. The explanatory variables included hi these
equations include characteristics of the workers (age at displacement
(AGET), job tenure at displacement (TENURE), education levels
(REDUC), race (RRACE), Spanish ethnicity (RHIS), marital status
(RMAR), weekly earnings in 1984 dollars (REARNT), coverage by
employer-provided health insurance (RHINST) and whether the
worker was a white-collar worker (WCOL)), year (YD) and region
(R) dummy variables, and area of employment characteristics
(the previous year©s area unemployment rate (AUNEMP), the an
nual change in the area unemployment rate (AUNEMPC), recent
and lagged changes in area employment and employment in
the worker©s major industry in the area (AEMPC1, AEMPC2,
AEMPC3, AEMPC4), and whether the individual resides in an
SMSA (MSMSA)).
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Table 5.9
Probit Quit Prior to Displacement Equations for
Full-Time Workers Who Received Advance Notice
(absolute value {-statistics)
Explanatory
Male
Female
Male
Female
variables
Layoff
Layoff
Shutdown
Shutdown
INTERCEPT -2.581 (1.4)
-.504 (0.4) -.424 (0.5) -3.004 (0.6)
AGET
-.013 (1.9)
-.019 (1.9)
.002 (0.2)
-.015 (2.2)*
TENURE
.006 (0.4)
.006 (0.2) -.011 (1.0)
-.027 (1.4)
REDUC
.011 (0.4)
.046(1.1)
.053 (2.1)* -.020 (0.5)
RRACE
-.493 (2.1)*
.167(0.7) -.207 (0.9)
-.212 (0.5)
RHISP
-.067 (0.2)
-.345 (0.8)
.308 (1.2)
-.237 (0.6)
RMAR
-.056 (0.4)
.016(0.1) -.063 (0.5)
-.195 (1.3)
RHINST
-.078 (0.6)
.298 (1.5) -.028 (0.2)
.092 (0.6)
REARNT
.000 (0.7)
-.001 (0.9) -.001 (1.8)
.001 (1.0)
WCOL
.331 (2.2)* -.139 (0.7)
.423 (3.2)*
.368 (2.2)*
AUNEMPC
.087 (1.2)
-.147 (1.2) -.021 (0.3)
.061 (0.6)
AUNEMP
-.040 (0.8)
-.001 (0.0)
.033 (0.8)
.024 (0.4)
AEMPC1
4.876 (1.0)
4.094 (0.6) -5.133(1.1)
5.517 (0.8)
AEMPC2
-.338 (0.1)
1.740 (0.3) 6.044 (1.8) -1.886 (0.9)
AEMPC3
-2.012(1.0) -1.633 (0.3) -1.381 (0.6) -2.055 (0.4)
AEMPC4
.198 (0.2)
3.720(1.6) -2.772 (1.0)* -.214(0.1)
MSMSA
.019 (0.2)
-.110(0.6)
.147 (1.0)
-.160(1.0)
YD1
2.167 (1.1)
-.432 (0.6) -.335 (0.5)
2.796 (0.5)
YD2
2.070(1.1)
-.604 (0.8) -.796 (1.1)
3.005 (0.6)
YDS
1.716 (0.9)
-.129 (0.2) -.747 (1.0)
2.495 (0.5)
YD4
1.786 (1.0)
-.691 (1.0) -1.126(1.6)
2.097 (0.4)
YDS
1.555 (0.8)
-.061 (0.1) -1.126(1.6)
2.097 (0,4)
Rl
-.311 (1.4)
.095 (0.3) -.174(0.9)
-.064 (0.3)
R2
-.306 (1.6)
-.019 (0.6) -.016 (0.1)
-.424(1.7)
R3
.040 (0.2)
-.265 (0.9) -.199(1.1)
-.089 (0.3)
X2 (DOF)
49.732 (25) 27.501 (25) 65.954 (25) 31.576 (25)
Quit = 1
98
54
129
49
Quit = 0
959
405
663
453
'Coefficient statistically significantly different from zero at .05 level, two-tail test.
See table 3.1 for variable definitions.
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Quite strikingly, the explanatory power of these models is quite
low.9 There is evidence for three of the four groups that, other things
held constant, older workers were less likely to quit than younger
workers and white-collar workers were more likely to quit than bluecollar workers. However, job tenure and earnings levels of these
workers did not influence their quit probabilities and only for one
group, males displaced due to plant shutdowns, was there any evi
dence that a worker©s schooling level was positively associated with
his probability of leaving prior to displacement. Area employment
and unemployment conditions also bore no relationship to the prob
ability of quitting.
The evidence presented in this section cannot be interpreted as
providing strong support for the hypothesis that provision of advance
notice would lead a firm©s most productive workers to quit their jobs
prior to displacement. Based upon the available data in the SOW, for
the most part the quit decision was not highly correlated with ob
served determinants of productivity and was almost a random pro
cess. Although advance notice does permit some workers to find new
employment, and thus quit prior to their displacement dates, these
workers do not appear to systematically be among firms© most pro
ductive workers. 10
Conclusions
The conclusions obtained from this chapter can be summarized
briefly. Having advance notice did significantly increase the proba
bility that a displaced worker in the 1984 SOW did not experience
any weeks of nonemployment. The largest increase was for males
who had been displaced due to a plant shutdown and the major ben
eficiaries within this group were white-collar workers. In contrast,
once a displaced worker experienced any weeks of nonemployment,
the presence of advance notice had no effect on his or her ultimate
duration of nonemployment. Advance notice thus seemed to help
displaced workers in the sample only if they found new employment
prior to displacement. Analyses of which displaced workers who re-
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ceived advance notice actually quit their jobs prior to the displace
ment date do not provide strong support for the hypothesis that
advance notice leads a firm©s most productive workers to quit prior
to displacement.
NOTES
1. Technical details of the estimation of this model appear in appendix B.
2. See appendix B for details.
3. The proportions with zero spell length in table 5.4 differ from those found in table S.I
because the former refer only to individuals whose data were used in the analyses in table 5.2.
Due to missing data on some explanatory variables, the sample size used in table 5.2 is
smaller than that used in table 5.1.
4. These percentages are calculated as follows:
male layoff (-.022)(.6)/.087 = -.152
female layoff (-.035)(.6)/.088 = -.239
male shutdown (-.084)(.6)/.161 = -.313
female shutdown (-.043)(.6)/. 145 = -.178
5. The analyses in this section are restricted to workers aged 55 and under as of the displace
ment date, to avoid complications due to the retirement behavior of older workers. Preliminary
tests suggested, however, that inclusion of older workers in the analyses did not alter signifi
cantly any of the results that follow.
6. See appendix B for details.
7. See appendix B for details.
8. See appendix B for details.
9. Experimentation with the inclusion of quadratic terms in AGET and TENURE indicated
that neither improved the model©s explanatory power.
10. Put another way, productivity on the job and success in job search do not appear to be
highly correlated.

Advance Notice and Survey Date
Employment and Earnings
Background data on the January 1984 survey date employment
status of those workers in the SOW for whom we had weekly earn
ings information as of their displacement dates are found in table
6.1. The bottom row of the table indicates that in each of the four
gender/reason-for-displacement groups, from 51 to 62 percent of
these workers who had been displaced during the 1979-83 period
were employed at the January 1984 survey date. 1
What about the earnings levels of the reemployed workers vis-a
vis their predisplacement earnings? All predisplacement earnings fig
ures have been converted by us to January 1984 dollars by
multiplying them by the ratio of the January 1984 Consumer Price
Index (CPI) to the CPI in the year of displacement. The remainder of
table 6.1 presents summary statistics on the ratio of survey date to
predisplacement real weekly earnings for those displaced workers
who were reemployed at the survey date. 2
The top row suggests that, on average, those displaced workers
who found reemployment experienced only small real earnings
losses, as compared to their own predisplacement earnings. The
mean ratio of survey date to predisplacement real earnings varied
across the four gender/reason-for-displacement groups from .95 to
.97. Put another way, on average these reemployed workers© real
earnings fell by only 3 to 5 percent. 3 Averages, however, mask con
siderable variation in individual experiences. The data reported in
the table on the ratio of survey date to displacement date real earn
ings indicate that 25 percent of each group©s reemployed workers
suffered real earnings losses of at least 8 to 10 percent, while an
other 25 percent experienced at least moderate real earnings in
creases of 1 to 2 percent.
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Table 6.1
Ratio of Survey Date to Predisplacement Real Weekly Earnings
for Workers Reemployed as of the Survey Week in the
January 1984 CPS Displaced Worker Sample
Male
Layoff

Female
Layoff

Mean (std. dev.)

0.96 (.09)

Distribution
Minimum
25 percentile
Median
75 percentile
Maximum

0.29
0.92
0.98
1.02
1.66

Fraction of
sample employed

.57

Female
Shutdown

0.95 (.11)

Male
Shutdown
0.97 (.09)

0.96 (. 11)

0.49
0.90
0.97
1.01
1.63

0.39
0.92
0.98
1.02
1.28

0.48
0.92
0.98
1.01
1.33

.62

.55

.51___

SOURCE: Authors© computations from the January 1984 CPS Survey of Displaced Workers
sample used in the analyses. Distributions for workers with and without advance notice are
very similar.

Did the receipt of advance notice of impending displacement in
fluence displaced workers© probabilities of being reemployed at the
survey date? For those displaced workers who are reemployed at the
survey date, did advance notice influence the ratio of their survey
date to predisplacement real weekly earnings? This chapter provides
answers to these questions.

Probability of Employment at the Survey Date
Table 6.2 presents the results of our estimating probit probability
of being employed as of the survey date equations for the displaced
workers in our sample.4 The explanatory variables used are those
found in the duration of nonemployment equations presented in the
last chapter, with the addition of the unemployment rate in 1984 in
the area in which the individual resided (AU84). The latter is entered
to control for economic conditions in the area.
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Table 6.2
Probit Probability of Employment at Survey Date Equations
(absolute value /-statistics)
Explanatory
variables

Male
Layoff

INTERCEPT
AGET
AGET2
REDUC
REDUC2
AGEED
TENURE
TEN2
RRACE
RVET
RHISP
RMAR
RHINST
YD1
YD2
YDS
YD4
YDS
Rl
R2
R3
WCOL
MANUF
AU
AU84
RADV

-1.166(1.5)
.008 (0.3)
-.000 (0.7)
.192(2.2)*
-.003 (1.2)
-.002 (1.5)
-.007 (0.5)
-.000 (0.2)
-.475 (5.7)*
.080 (1.2)
-.086 (0.7)
.302(5.1)*
.126(2.0)*
.970 (4.3)*
.807 (3.8)*
.716 (3.6)*
.602(3.1)*
.006 (0.0)
-.089 (1.0)
-.121 (1.6)
.114(1.5)
.057 (0.8)
.121 (2.0)*
.028 (1.5)
-.098 (6.3)*
-.013 (0.2)

X2 (DOF)
Emp = 1
Emp = 0

411.622 (25)
1408
1084

Female
Layoff
-1.296 (1.1)
.066(2.1)*
-.001 (2.6)*
.085 (0.7)
.000(0.1)
-.002 (1.3)
.020 (0.9)
-.001 (1.3)
-.721 (6.3)*
-.235 (1.3)
-.320 (3.9)*
.317 (3.6)*
.579(1.7)
.523 (1.6)
.302 (0.9)
.138 (0.4)
-.358(1.1)
-.344 (2.7)*
-.226 (2.0)*
-.008 (0.7)
.347 (3.9)*
-.010(0.1)
.075 (2.5)*
-.103 (4.1)*
.078 (1.0)
187.311 (24)
582
560

Male
Shutdown

Female
Shutdown

1.387 (1.5)
-.001 (0.1)
-.001 (2.4)*
-.063 (0.7)
.000(0.1)
.003 (2.3)*
.020(1.5)
-.001 (2.2)*
-.341 (3.1)*
.012(0.1)
.145 (1.0)
.193 (2.5)*
.135 (1.8)
-.398 (0.9)
-.205 (0.4)
-.301 (0.7)
-.512(1.2)
-.774 (1.9)
-.181 (1.8)
-.112 (1.2)
.221 (2.5)*
.007 (0.1)
.051 (0.2)
.002 (0.9)
-.051 (2.6)*
.127 (2.0)*

-3.676 (2.3)*
.119(3.9)*
-.001 (5.0)*
.298 (1.9)
-.008 (1.6)
-.002 (1.4)
.010 (0.5)
-.001 (1.3)
-.498 (3.8)*

189.555 (25)
1063
654

168.496 (24)
573
475

-.143(0.7)
-.390 (4.5)*
.142(1.6)
.898 (1.1)
1.126(1.4)
.993 (1.3)
.963 (1.2)
.852 (1.1)
.307 (2.2)*
.060 (0.5)
.184(1.7)
.258 (2.8)*
-.131 (1.4)
-.101 (3.1)*
-.019 (0.7)
.006(0.1)

©Coefficient statistically significantly different from zero at .05 level; two-tail test.
AU84 area unemployment rate in 1984. See table 3.1 for all other variable definitions.

The estimates in this table suggest that many of the variables
other than receipt of advance notice have important explanatory
power. For example, reemployment probabilities appear to have

68

Advance Notice and Survey Date Employment and Earnings

declined monotonically with age for males displaced due to plant
shutdowns. For both female groups, the probabilities first increased
and then decreased with age, with the decline starting at about age
33 for those who had been laid off and at about age 60 for those
displaced due to a shutdown. Nonwhites in all four groups had lower
survey date reemployment probabilities than otherwise comparable
whites. Married men were more likely and married females less
likely, other things equal, to be reemployed at the survey date. The
estimates also suggest that respondents covered by a health insurance
policy at their predisplacement jobs and, for females, white-collar
workers, were more likely to be reemployed.
For workers displaced due to a layoff, other things held constant,
the further the layoff date was in the past, the more likely the
worker was to be reemployed as of the survey date. Somewhat sur
prisingly, however, this result did not hold for males displaced due to
a plant shutdown. Finally, as expected, the higher the unemployment
rate in the local area as of the survey date, the lower the probability
that the displaced workers were reemployed.
Most important to us, only for males displaced due to a plant shut
down did advance notice appear to significantly increase the proba
bility of being employed at the survey date. Since this is the group
(see chapter 5) for whom advance notice led to the greatest reduction
in the probability that a displaced worker experienced positive weeks
of nonemployment, this result is not surprising.
Some idea of the magnitude of the effect of advance notice is
found in table 6.3. Here we have used the coefficient estimates from
table 6.2 and the value of all the other explanatory variables for each
individual to compute each individual©s marginal increase in the
probability of being employed at the survey date if he or she re
ceived advance notice of displacement. 5 For males displaced due to
plant shutdowns, the increase ranged from .004 to .051 with an av
erage increase of .044. Since approximately 60 percent of this group
received advance notice, we can infer that advance notice increased
the proportion of the group that was employed by about .026; this
should be contrasted with the actual reemployment rate of the group
of .62. At best then, advance notice had only a marginal effect on
this group©s survey date reemployment rate.
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Table 6.3
Marginal Effects of Having Received Advance Notice on the Probability
of Being Employed at the Survey Date

Computed effects by individual
Male Layoff
Female Layoff
Male Shutdown
Female Shutdown

[-57]
[-51]
[-62]
[.55]

Mean
-.0045
.0271
.0442*
.0022

Std. dev.
.0008
.0047
.0063*
.0004

Minimum
-.0052
.0010
.0041*
.0000

Maximum
-.0008
.0311
.0506*
.0025

[ ] fraction in the group who were employed at the survey date.
*Based on RADV coefficient that was statistically significantly different from zero at the .05
level; two-tail test.

Survey Date Earnings for Those Reemployed
Table 6.4 presents estimates of the logarithm of survey date
weekly earnings equations that used the subsample of displaced
workers who were reemployed at the survey date. The variables in
cluded in these equations are the same as those included in the prob
ability of employment equations (table 6.2), as well as the logarithm
of the individual©s weekly earnings (converted to 1984 dollars) as of
his or her date of displacement. As the table indicates, predisplacement earnings were obviously an important determinant of postdisplacement earnings.
Turning to other results, the coefficients of the age variables sug
gest that earnings losses increased with age, although job tenure per
se did not seem to have any independent effect. Other things held
constant, married males© earnings were higher than nonmarried
males© and workers covered by an employer-provided health insur
ance policy prior to displacement did better than workers who did
not have such policies. As expected, higher local area unemployment
rates were associated with lower survey date earnings; on average, a
1 percentage point increase in the area unemployment rate was asso
ciated with 2 to 31/2 percent lower survey date earnings.
The results in this table suggest, however, that advance notice
was not associated with higher survey date earnings. As this is an
important negative finding, we performed a number of extensions to
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Table 6.4
Logarithm of Survey Date Earnings Equations for
Individuals Employed at the Survey Date
(absolute value /-statistics)

Explanatory
variables
INTERCEPT
AGET
AGET23
REDUC
REDUC2
AGEED
TENURE
TEN2a
RRACE
RHISP
RMAR
RVET
RHINST
YD1
YD2
YD3
YD4
YDS
Rl
R2
R3
WCOL
MANUF
AU
AU84
LREARNT
RADV
R2
DOF

Male

Layoff
1.198( 2.4)
.045 ( 3.7)
-.049 ( 4.0)
.162 ( 3.2)
-.004 ( 2.6)
.001 ( 0.8)
-.012 ( 1.6)
.034 ( 1.1)
-.097 ( 1.8)
.096 ( 1.4)
.157( 4.8)
-.005 (0.1)
.104( 2.9)
-.170( 1.2)
-.116( 0.8)
-.137 ( 1.0)
-.177( 1.3)
-.239 ( 1.7)
-.054 ( 1.1)
-.115 ( 2.8)
-.097 ( 2.5)
.031 ( 0.8)
-.100( 3.3)
.016 ( 1.7)
-.035 ( 4.2)
.479 (13.8)
-.031 ( 1.1)
.307
1257

Female
Layoff

Male
Shutdown

1.567(2.1)
.036(1.8)
-.031 (1.5)
.127(1.7)
-.000 (0.4)
-.002 (1.8)
.018(1.1)
-.093 (1.1)
-.057 (0.6)
.017(0.1)
.062 (1.2)

2.032 ( 4.3)
.025 (2.1)
-.034 ( 2.4)
.020 ( 0.4)
.001 ( 0.5)
-.000 ( 0.0)
.002 ( 0.3)
-.030 ( 1.0)
-.077 (1.3)
-.062 ( 0.8)
.157( 4.0)
-.029 ( 0.8)
.051 ( 1.3)
-.051 ( 0.3)
-.155( 0.9)
-.161 ( 0.9)
-.161 ( 0.9)
-.143( 0.8)
.001 ( 0.1)
-.057 ( 1.2)
-.007 ( 0.2)
.151 ( 3.7)
-.041 ( 1.2)
.009 ( 0.8)
-.019 ( 2.1)
.590(13.1)
-.033 ( 1.0)

.083
-.409
-.229
-.298
-.255
-.256
-.191
-.297
-.191
.022
-.003
-.013
-.025
.485
.045
.296
502

(1.4)
(1.8)
(1.0)
(1.4)
(1.2)
(1.2)
(2.4)
(4.3)
(2.9)
(0.4)
(0.1)
(0.7)
(1.6)
(7.3)
(0.9)

.361
908

Female
Shutdown
1.438
.043
-.056
-.019
.002
-.000
-.015
.018
.043
-.054
.010

(1.3)
(2.1)
(3.1)
(0.2)
(0.7)
(0.2)
(1.1)
(0.2)
(0.5)
(0.7)
(0.2)

.158 (2.8)
.030(0.1)
.003 (0.0)
-.078 (0.1)
-.070(0.1)
-.230 (0.4)
-.014 (0.2)
-.043 (2.0)
-.111 (1.7)
.069(1.3)
.050 (0.9)
.038(1.7)
-.034 (2.1)
.562 (9.2)
.029 (0.6)
.341
498

"Coefficient has been multiplied by 100.
LREARNT of weekly earnings (expressed in 1984 dollars) at the displacement date. See tables
3.1 and 6.2 for other variable definitions.

see how sensitive the result was to different econometric specifica
tions and the results of these efforts are summarized in table 6.5.
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Table 6.5
Coefficients of RADV in Survey Date Logarithm of Earnings Equations
Various Specifications

Male
Layoff
(0)

(S)

LREARNT-EXOG
(1) RADV

-.031 -.030

(2) RADV
RADV*WC

-.039 -.037
.027 .027

(3) RADV
-.027 -.025
RADV*WC
.024 .024
RADV*MAN -.030 -.030

Female
Layoff
(0)

Male
Shutdown
(0)

(S)

(S)

-.033 -.080
-.094
-.106
-.039 -.088
.249*
.253*
.018 .022
-.007
-.019 -.023 -.071
.193** .197** .012 .017
-.149
-.148
-.041 -.038
.045

.042

Female
Shutdown
(0)

(S)

.029

.031

.029
.001

.030
.003
.010
.015
.037

.013
.009
.030

LREARNT-END
(4) RADV

-.031 -.028

(5) RADV
RADV*WC

-.039 -.036 -.117
.032 .032 .259*

-.139
.265*

-.053 -.118** .029 .028
-.065 -.134*
.029 .029
.038 .045
-.001 -.001

(6) RADV
-.026 -.025 -.040
RADV*WC
.029 .029 .213*
RADV*MAN -.031 -.031 -.129

-.062
.219*
-.127

-.053 -.122**
.034 .041
-.030 -.027

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
and
(O)
(S)

same
same
same
same
same
same

.022

.010

.021
.004
.015

.018
.004
.020

specification as table 6.4,
as (1), but interaction of RADV and WC added,
as (2), but interaction of RADV and MAN added,
as (1), but LREARNT treated as endogenous,
as (2), but LREARNT treated as endogenous,
as (3), but LREARNT treated as endogenous,

no correction for being employed at survey date.
correction for being employed at survey date using inverse Mills ratios computed from
equations in table 6.2.

First, since the equations in table 6.4 were estimated using sam
ples of displaced workers who were reemployed at the survey date,
they are subject to possible sample selection bias. As such, we reestimated the model using the two-stage method first suggested by
Heckman (1979) to control for the probability a worker was em
ployed at the survey date. 6 A comparison of the coefficients of the
advance notice variables from the equations that used OLS (column
O) and those that used this two-stage method (column S) indicates
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that using the latter method provides no evidence that having ad
vance notice increased survey date earnings (row 1).
Second, we reestimated the earnings equations, interacting the ad
vance notice variable with whether the worker was a white-collar
worker and with whether he or she worked in manufacturing prior to
displacement. Our goal here was to see if there was any differential
effect of advance notice on earnings across occupations and indus
tries. When this was done (rows 2 and 3), the results suggested that
having advance notice was associated with an increase in survey date
weekly earnings of roughly 15 to 20 percent for white-collar females
who had been displaced due to a layoff. No such effects were found
for other gender/occupational groups, however, and the effects of ad
vance notice did not appear to depend upon whether the worker was
displaced from a manufacturing job.
Third, all of the previous results treat predisplacement earnings as
exogenous. In reality these earnings were probably determined by
many of the other variables that appear in table 6.3, as well as other
variables. The last three rows of table 6.5 show what happens to the
advance notice variables© coefficients when we treat the logarithm
of predisplacement earnings as endogenous and use an instrument
for it in the analysis. 7 Doing so alters none of the previous results,
save that advance notice now appears to have been associated with
lower survey date earnings for males displaced due to a shutdown.
Given the perverse nature of this result, we place little significance
in it. 8
One final extension we conducted was to include a variable indi
cating whether the displaced worker had received unemployment in
surance (UI) in the estimated survey date earnings equation. The
sample was restricted here to individuals who had postdisplacement
nonemployment durations of at least one week and predisplace
ment job tenures of at least one year, to assure us that all indivi
duals in the sample should have been eligible to receive UI pay
ments. As table 6.6 indicates, those people who actually had re
ceived UI did not wind up in better paying jobs, even though
evidence presented in table 5.7 showed that they had longer dura
tions of nonemployment.
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Table 6.6
Marginal Effect of Having Received Unemployment
_________Insurance on Survey Date Earnings8_________
Group
___
Marginal effect
Male Layoff
-.036(1.0)
Female Layoff
-.096(1.1)
Male Shutdown
-.007 (0.1)
Female Shutdown________________.101 (1.4)______
" Sample confined to individuals with predisplacement tenure of at least one year and postdisplacement nonemployment duration of greater than one week.

Concluding Remarks
The results reported in this chapter suggest that having received
advance notice had very little impact on the January 1984 survey
date employment status and earnings of workers displaced during the
1979-83 period. Only for males who had been displaced due to a
plant shutdown was there any evidence that advance notice led to an
increased probability of being employed at the survey date. While a
substantial fraction of displaced workers come from this group, even
here the marginal effect was small. Only for white-collar females
who had been displaced due to layoff was there any evidence that
advance notice led to higher survey date weekly earnings. While the
implied effects of advance notice on earnings of members of this
group were in the order of 15 percent, females who were laid off
made up only 16 percent of all the displaced workers for whom we
had earnings data (see table 6.4) and not all of them were whitecollar workers. Hence, the overall effect of advance notice on survey
date earnings of displaced workers in the SDW was quite small.
NOTES
1. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (1985) reports that about 60 percent of workers in the Jan
uary 1984 SDW were reemployed as of the survey date. Our sample, which yields a somewhat
lower overall percentage, is confined to those displaced workers who were working full-time at
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the displacement date and for whom data on predisplacement earnings were reported. In addi
tion, the BLS restricted their attention to workers who had at least three years of tenure with
their employers prior to displacement.
2. No obvious differences occurred in these summary statistics between people with and with
out advance notice, so we report only the overall group statistics here.
3. We should caution that this comparison ignores nonwage benefits. It also is strictly a predisplacement/postdisplacement comparison and does not take account of any real earnings
increases the individual may have received if he or she had remained employed, due to either
increases in seniority, or to economy-wide or firm-specific productivity increases.
4. See appendix B for details.
5. See appendix B for details.
6. See appendix B for details.
7. See appendix B for details.
8. A possible "explanation" for the result is as follows: Suppose these males displaced due to
shutdowns came primarily from unionized employment and were reemployed after displace
ment in nonunion jobs. The estimated wage loss associated with advance notice of around 11
to 13 percent could be interpreted simply as a union/nonunion wage differential estimate; panel
data estimates of union wage differentials often lie in this range. Since we have no data,
however, on these displaced workers© predisplacement union status, this explanation is purely
speculative.

Implications of Findings
Summary of Findings
Empirical analyses of the January 1984 SOW, which are reported
in chapters 4 through 6, indicate that there is very little support for
the proposition that workers who received advance notice paid for it
in the form of lower predisplacement wages. They also suggest that
it is difficult to explain which displaced workers received advance
notice prior to displacement using data on characteristics of the in
dividuals, data on characteristics of the workforce in the industries
in which they were employed, and data on employment growth and
unemployment in the areas and in the industries in the areas in
which they were employed. While some variables proved statisti
cally significant in formal probit models of the probability of receiv
ing advance notice (and the equations do have some predictive
power), in the main, few consistent patterns were observed across
the four groups. Thus, analyses of the effects of advance notice pro
visions that use the 1984 SOW can legitimately treat the existence of
advance notice as exogenous.
Our analyses do suggest that having advance notice did signifi
cantly increase the probability that a displaced worker would not ex
perience any unemployment. The largest increase was for males who
were displaced due to a plant shutdown and the major beneficiaries
within this group were white-collar workers. In contrast, once an
individual experienced any unemployment, the presence of advance
notice had no effect on his or her ultimate duration of nonemployment. Advance notice seemed to help, then, only if individuals could
find employment prior to displacement.
Analyses of the effects of advance notice on survey date earn
ings echoed the findings of Podgursky and Swaim (1987b) that, on
75
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average, receipt of advance notice had no affect on subsequent earn
ings once a displaced worker was reemployed. Only for white-collar
females who had been displaced due to a layoff was there any evi
dence that advance notice led to higher survey date weekly earnings,
and this group made up less than 15 percent of the SOW sample. The
major effect of advance notice on workers in the SDW sample, then,
was through decreasing the probability of observing positive nonemployment spell lengths.
Finally, for the people in the SDW sample who received advance
notice, we found no systematic evidence that variables that might be
proxies for productivity (job tenure, education, previous earnings)
systematically were associated with the probability that a worker
would quit prior to the date of his or her displacement. Thus, we
found no evidence that advance notice would lead a firm©s most pro
ductive workers to quit prior to the displacement date, thereby dis
rupting a firm©s operations in its final weeks.
Implications for Public Policy and for Future Research
A number of studies suggest that there are large private costs of
displacement to displaced workers. 1 While some fraction of the costs
may represent the dissipation of rents, a substantial portion represent
true social costs. Often these costs are transitory in nature; witness
the fact that real reemployment earnings of displaced workers in the
SDW who were reemployed at the survey date, on average, were
within 5 percent of their predisplacement earnings levels (table
6.1). 2 However, some workers suffer large losses which last for an
extended period of time; witness the large fraction of workers in the
SDW displaced during the 1979-83 period who were not reemployed
at the January 1984 survey date.
The literature surveyed in chapter 2 and our own empirical results
suggest that advance notice may well facilitate labor market adjust
ments by allowing displaced workers to find employment prior to
their date of displacement. Advance notice appears to reduce the
probability that displaced workers suffer any spell of unemployment
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and thus may well moderate temporary increases in area unemploy
ment rates. In both a number of the surveyed studies and our own,
"advance notice" included notice of very short duration and results
in these studies likely understate the effects of mandated notice of
longer duration. The individual worker-based data used in most of
the studies we discussed also did not permit analyses of whether ad
vance notice of pending displacements can lead to actions (e.g., re
organization, wage concessions, employee ownership) that help avert
displacements.
Although opponents of advance notice cite potential costs of
such policies, empirical studies have found no evidence that advance
notice causes firms© most productive workers to leave and that
the productivity of the remaining workers suffers. Moreover, save
for Lazear (1987), who found no statistically significant relation
ships, no systematic empirical evidence has been provided on the
other potential adverse effects of advance notice that opponents have
enumerated.
While at first glance this discussion suggests support for the new
federally mandated advance notice for displaced workers, several
cautions are in order. First, the effects of voluntary provision of ad
vance notice in situations where workers expect impending displace
ment anyway may be very different from the effects of mandated
advance notice in situations where the impending displacement is
completely unexpected by workers. 3 Indeed, one should recall that
the SOW, which our research and most of the research we surveyed
was based upon, asked only if workers received advance notice or
expected their displacement.
Future researchers will have access to the January 1988 Survey of
Displaced Workers which specifically asks displaced workers if they
received formal advance notice and, if so, how long the notice was.
However, even with these data, to adequately estimate the effects of
advance notice per se will require researchers to try to model what
displaced workers© expectations of displacement would have been in
the absence of advance notice. Put another way, researchers need to
estimate if formal advance notice actually communicates new infor
mation to workers.
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Second, the observation that the voluntary provision of advance
notice appears to reduce the probability a displaced worker will suf
fer any spell of unemployment does not necessarily imply that man
dated advance notice will increase employment and decrease
unemployment rates. Indeed, one can conceive of situations in which
displaced workers compete for a fixed number of vacant positions
that only a fraction of them can obtain. Advance notice gives those
workers who receive notice an advantage; it increases their probabil
ity of finding one of these jobs. However, if the number of vacant
positions is truly fixed, by necessity the probability that workers who
failed to receive notice find jobs would have to go down. In this
case, the gains to those workers who received notice would come
solely at the expense of those workers who failed to receive notice.
There would be no social gains from advance notice in the sense
that, on average, it would not influence aggregate employment levels
and/or unemployment rates.
Studies that use individual-based data sets, such as our own and
the others that used the SOW, cannot test for the possibility of such
displacement effects. The only study of U.S. data that addressed this
issue, Folbre, Leighton and Roderick (1984) did find evidence that
voluntary provision of advance notice led to smaller temporary in
creases in area unemployment rates. However, Lazear©s (1987) cross
country study found no significant effects of mandated advance
notice on national employment levels and unemployment rates.
Clearly more studies that focus on the effects of advance notice on
area economic outcomes are needed.
Suppose for a moment, however, that all voluntarily provided ad
vance notice actually does is "reshuffle" jobs among displaced
workers from those people who fail to receive notice to those people
who do receive it. In fact, evidence of this might strengthen the case
for federally mandated advance notice if the people who receive no
tice voluntarily are the ones least in need of such assistance. For
example, if high-wage, unionized workers were more likely to re
ceive notice than comparably-skilled, lower-wage nonunion workers
(table 1.6), implementation of federal legislation would allow the
latter a "better shot" at competing with the former for the avail-
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able jobs when they are displaced. One thus might be in favor of
advance notice legislation because of its potential redistributive ef
fects, even if one believes it will have no net effect on employment
or unemployment.
Ultimately, given all the evidence presented and cited above, the
position one takes towards advance notice legislation will depend
heavily on one©s preconceptions as to how labor markets function. If
one believes labor markets in the main are competitive and operate
primarily in an efficient manner, one might argue that the onus is on
those who propose government intervention to document empirically
what the benefits of the proposed legislation are and to document
that its adverse side effects will be small. Given such a view, one
might argue that the evidence presented here does not support gov
ernment intervention; there are too many results whose implications
are ambiguous and too many yet unanswered questions.
If, on the other hand, one believes that labor markets in the main
are not competitive and/or that important externalities exist when
workers are displaced, one will find the results presented here very
supportive of some form of intervention, perhaps in the form of ad
vance notice legislation.4 Such individuals may claim that we have
documented at least some private benefits that advance notice seems
to produce, without uncovering any evidence of its costs.
It is important when designing an intervention, however, to be
clear about the source of public concern. If the major concern is the
externality imposed on a local community due to a plant closing or
large scale layoff, then public policy should specifically address this
concern. Such a concern may argue for advance notice legislation.
However, in this case, exemptions should not be based on absolute
size, as is the case in the recently enacted Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act, but rather on the basis of size relative to
the local labor market. In contrast, if the source of concern is the
private costs workers suffer from displacement, then severance pay
provisions may be a viable alternative and/or addition to advance no
tice legislation.
Our own position is that given the social costs associated with
worker displacement, a strong case appears to exist for a federal
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policy relating to advance notice. One possibility is for the federal
government to encourage advance notice by providing inducements
for employers to voluntarily do so. 5 For example, the federal govern
ment could reduce the costs to firms of providing such notice by
funding a share of the unemployment benefits received by notified
workers and/or by reducing the firms© corporate profit tax rates.
Alternatively, federal legislation mandating advance notice of
plant closings or permanent layoffs (as has recently been enacted)
could be undertaken. Well-designed research is needed, however, to
more adequately address issues relating to the macro labor market
effects of the legislation, including whether advance notice of im
pending displacement can serve to help prevent displacement from
occurring, as proponents of the legislation often assert. Moreover,
since so much of prior research has focused on the potential benefits
of advance notice legislation, subsequent studies might also focus on
research issues that opponents have been concerned about, namely,
those relating to the costs of the legislation.
NOTES
1. See Daniel Hamermesh (1987) for a review of the literature in this area.
2. As was done in chapter 6, we stress that such comparisons ignore any real wage increases
the displaced workers would have received if they had not been displaced due to increases in
their job tenure and general firm-specific real wage increases.
3. We are grateful to Sherwin Rosen for stressing this point to us.
4. See chapter 1 for a discussion of worker displacement and externalities.
5. We are grateful to Louis Jacobson for suggesting this alternative to us.

Appendix A
The Matching of CPS 3-Digit Industries
to 52 Broader Industry Groups Used in Table 3.1
Communication (440 to 442)
Utilities & Sanitary Services (460 to 472)
Wholesale Trade, Total (500 to 549, 552
to 571)
Groceries & Farm Products (550 to 551)
General Merchandise Stores (591 to 600)
Food Bakery & Dairy Stores (601 to 611)
Automobile Dealers & Gas Stations (612
to 622)
Apparel & Accessory Stores (630 to 631)
Eating & Drinking Places (641)
Other Retail Trade (580 to 590, 632 to
640, 642 to 691)
Banking & Credit Agencies (700 to 702)
Insurance (711)
Other Finance & Real Estate (710, 712)
Business Services (721 to 742)
Automotive Repair & Services (750 to
751)
Other Repair Services (752 to 760)
Hotels & Lodging (762 to 770)
Other Personal Services (761, 771 to 791)
Entertainment & Recreation Services (800,
802)
Hospitals (831)
Health Services, Except Hospitals (812 to
830, 832 to 840)
Educational Services, Government (842,
850, 852)
Educational Services, Private (851, 860)
Social Services (861 to 871)
Other Professional Services (841, 872 to
892)
Public Administration (900 to 932)

Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries (010
to 031)
Mining (040 to 050)
Construction (060)
Food & Kindred Products (100 to 122)
Textile Mill Products (132 to 150)
Apparel & Other Finished Textiles (151
to 152)
Paper & Allied Products (160 to 162)
Printing, Publishing & Allied Products
(171 to 172)
Chemicals & Allied (180 to 192)
Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastic (210 to
212)
Other Nondurable Manufacturing (130,
200, 201, 220, 221, 222)
Lumber & Wood, Except Furniture (230
to 241)
Furniture & Fixtures (242)
Stone, Clay, Glass & Concrete (250 to
262)
Primary Iron & Steel (270 to 271)
Primary Nonferrous (272 to 280)
Fabricated Metal (281 to 301)
Machinery, Except Electric (310 to 332)
Electric Machinery (340 to 350)
Motor Vehicles (351)
Aircraft & Space Vehicles (352)
Other Transport Equipment (360 to 370)
Other Durable Goods (371 to 392)
Railroads (400)
Trucking Services (410)
Other Transportation (401, 402, 411 to
432)
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Appendix B
Technical Appendix to Chapters 4, 5 and 6
Chapter 4
Consider the following model:
(A4.1a)y1 *=x/|81 +u1
(A4.1b)y2*=x%+u2
Asterisks will denote variables that are only partially observed or never observ
ed throughout this appendix. Let y!* and y2* be the logarithms of the
predisplacement wage rate for a worker with and without advance notice,
respectively. The vector x contains exogenous characteristics of the worker,
the firm in which he is employed and the area in which he works, that are
postulated to influence wages. For notational simplicity we adopt the conven
tion that if a variable does not appear in an equation, then its coefficient is
zero. The disturbance term u=(ut , u2)© has mean 0 and is assumed to be in
dependent of x. We will denote the (ij) element of its covariance matrix, £,
by ay.
The wage differential a worker pays for advance notice is (yi*-y2*). Sup
pose the worker©s desire for advance notice is a function of the wage difference,
his characteristics, characteristics of his employer and area, and unobservable
factors that we treat as a random disturbance term (e3).
(A4.2) y3*=a(y1 * - y2*)+xb3 +e3 =x/33 +u3 ,
where u3 =e3 +a(u, - u2) and /33 =b3 +a(|3i - |82).
Suppose also for now that if a worker wants notice, then he gets it. We write
this as,
(A4.3) y3 =l if y3*>0 and 0 otherwise,
where y3 = 1 denotes the presence of advance notice.© Provided that x con
tains an intercept, the choice of 0 as the threshold in equation (A4.3) is
inconsequential.
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Assume that u=(ui, u2, u3)© is multivariate normal with mean 0 and variance
E and is independent of x. Then the probability that a worker is observed hav
ing advance notice is given by
P(y3 = l|x)=P(y3*>0|x)=P(u3> - x/83).
If we standardize the expression above by dividing both sides by the standard
deviation of u3 , g3 , we obtain
(A4.4) P(y3 = l|x)=P[u3/a3 > - x/33/a3]=F[x|83/(T3],
where F( ) is the standard normal distribution function.
The model in (A4.4) is a probit model and estimation is easily carried out
using maximum likelihood methods. Note that we can only identify y3 =p3/a3,
that is, we can identify the slope coefficients |33 only up to a scaling factor.
Now consider the wage equations (Al . 1). Let yi and y2 denote the observed
values of yi* and y2*, respectively. Clearly, we observe y! only when y3 = l
and observe y2 only when y3 =0. Consider the yi equation
E(y1 |x)=E(y,*|x, y3 = l)=E(y,*|x, y3*>0)=xj3 1 +E(u1 |u3 > - x/33).
The problem is the last term. If Ui does not have a zero mean in the subsample
with advance notice, then least squares estimates of the wage equation for this
subsample will suffer from selectivity bias. The "correct" wage equation to
estimate is
(A4.5) E(y,|x)=x0,+a3 ei3m, (x03/<73),
where gi3 =aJ3/a33 , m,(z) =f(z)/F(z), f( ) is the standard normal density func
tion, and, as defined above, <jjj is the (i,j) element of the covariance matrix
of u. The last term in equation (A4.5) is the source of the bias, for if it is
nonzero, then conventional OLS procedures, which ignore it, omit an ex
planatory variable that is correlated with the other explanatory variables, leading
to bias in the estimates of fr. The bias disappears only when u, and u3 are
independent, so that Q i3 is 0. Since U3 =e3 +a(u1 - u2), it is unlikely that U!
and u3 are independent.
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A similar argument applies to estimating the wage equation for the subsample of workers who do not have advance notice. The analogous equation for
wages without notice is
(A4.6) E(y2 |x, y3=OX=x2j32 +a3 623 m2 (x/33/cr3),
where m2 (z)= - f (z)/(l-F(z)) and e 23 =a23/a33 . Again the source of the bias
(the presence of the last term) should be obvious.
Estimation of the wage equations and probability of advance notice can be
done using the method of maximum likelihood. We employ a less computa
tionally intensive multistep procedure, initially developed by Heckman (1979)
that proceeds as follows:
Step 1. Apply probit analysis to equation (A4.4). This yields estimates 73 of
73=03/a3 . These estimates are found in table 4.4 in the text.
Step 2. Use 73 to "onstruct estimates of m^x/V^s) and m2(xj33/a3). Denote
these estimates as rhi and m2 , respectively.
Step 3. Estimate the wage equations separately on the appropriate subsamples,
adding in, (fh2) to the regressor variables in the y, (y2) equation. Denote the
coefficient of mj as fy. If we fail to reject the null hypothesis^ that 6j=0 then
there is no bias. If we reject the null, then the coefficients j8j are consistent
estimates of /^ but the estimated standard errors are incorrect.
"^
yv
**
**
Step 4, For each individual use the j8i and /32 from step 3 to construct yi =x//3i
and y2 =x/j82 . These are consistent estimates of the predicted values of y,*
and y2 * from the corrected wage equations and thus we can obtain a consis
tent estimate of the wage differential.
Now consider a more general model that corresponds to equations (4.7) to
(4.9) in the text. Firms have a propensity to offer advance notice which de
pend on observed characteristics x. Write this as
(A4.7) y4*=x&+u4
and add u4 to the vector of disturbances. Firms will be willing to offer workers
notice only if y4* is large enough, so
(A4.8) y4 = l if y4 *>0 and 0 otherwise,
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where y4 = l denotes that a firm is willing to offer notice and y4 =0 if it is
not willing.
We observe advance notice only when both workers want it and firms are
willing to offer it. Let y5 = l denote the presence of advance notice. Then
(A4.9) y5 =y3y4.
The probability of observing advance notice is
(A4.10) P(ys = l)=P(y3 = l and y4 =l)
=P(y3*>0, y4*>0)=P(u3 >-x03 , u4 >-x04).
After appropriate normalization, this is a truncated bivariate probit model (see
Poirer (1980)) and it can be estimated by maximum likelihood methods. Given
the estimates from this problem one can proceed in a multistep manner similar
to that outlined above.
Identification in this model, however, requires that at least one variable found
in the y3* equation be excluded from the y4* equation and vice versa. Unfor
tunately, as described in the text, it did not prove possible for us to identify
the model.
Chapter 5
The Probit Probability of Experiencing Positive Duration
of Nonemployment Model
Consider the following model
.1) y*=x0+u
where u is normally distributed with mean zero and variance a1 , y* can be
interpeted as the individual©s unobserved propensity to experience a positive
duration of nonemployment and the vector x includes those explanatory
variables expected to influence this propensity. We observe only whether the
individual experiences a positive duration and let y equal one if he does and
zero if he does not. Without loss of generality, we assume that
(A5.2)y=l if y*>0
Oify*<0.
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The probability of seeing y = 1 is
P(y = l|x)=/>(y*>0|x)=P(u> - x/3)=P(u/a> - x/3/a),
so
(A5.3) P(y = l|x)=F(x/3/(j)=F(x7)
where F(©) is the standard normal distribution function and y=@/a. Note that
we can only identify y=@/a, that is, we can only identify the coefficients up
to a scaling factor. Similarly, we have
(A5.4) P(y=0|x) = l - F(X7).
Equations (A5.3) and (A5.4) define the sample likelihood and the method
of maximum likelihood can be used to obtain an estimate y of 7. Such estimates
appear in table 5.2 of the text.
Interpretation of the Parameters of the Probit Model
The coefficients 7 are not sufficient to answer questions concerning the ef
fect of a change in x on the probability that an individual experiences a positive
duration (y = 1). To see this, first consider the linear model in equation (A5. 1).
Clearly dy*/dx does equal 7 in this model. But now consider the censored
model in equation (A5.3):
(A5.5) dP/d\ (u = l|x)=dF(x7)/ax=f(x7) 7,
where f( ) is the standard normal density function. That is,
(A5.6) f(z)=(27r)- 1/2 exp (-1/2 z2).
The effect of a change in x depends on the value of x in this censored model.
The standard normal distribution function traces out an S-curve from 0 to 1
P(y =
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as x7 ranges from minus infinity to plus infinity as indicated in the picture
above. The derivative of interest is the slope of this S-curve, which depends
on the point at which we examine the slope. That point depends on the par
ticular value of x.
Now consider two thought experiments. The first is to consider an individual
with a particular value of x, for example, x=x where x is the sample mean
of x. For this individual the derivative of interest is
(A5 .7) 3P(y = 1 1 x = x)/3x = f(x7)7.
The second thought experiment is to draw an individual at random from
the population and perturb his x©s. On average, what is the effect on the prob
ability that y = 1? The answer here is the mean derivative in the sample, not
the derivative evaluated at the mean x. That is, the relevant effect in this se
cond experiment is
(A5.8) E[dP(y = 1 1 x)/3x] =E[f(xT)7]
where the expectation is over the distribution of the characteristics x. The
estimators for these two quantities are respectively
(A5.70 f(x7)7
and
N
(A5.80 (1/N) £ f(xi7)r
The answers to these two thought experiments need not be similar. Con
sider, for example, the case in which the sample is such that the xj7 are
clustered in the two tails of the S-curve. Since the S-curve is relatively flat
in the tails, the derivatives for each individual will be small, and hence the
average derivative will be small. However, it is possible that x7 will lie in
the middle, where the S-curve is steep. Hence the derivative at the mean will
be much larger than the mean derivative, and focusing on the former will yield
misleading inference about the effects of changes in x on any individual©s prob
ability of incurring a positive spell of nonemployment.
Finally, note that when the explanatory variable of interest is a dummy
variable, the effect of a change in the variable (from zero to one) is computed
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in a different way. Let x2 be the dummy variable of interest and let \i be the
other explanatory variables, and partition 7 =(71, 72) to match. Then the ap
propriate formulas that correspond to the two thought experiments are
(A5.7") F(xl7- 1 +72) - F(xl7l), and
N
(A5.8") (1/N) E

respectively.
The estimated mean marginal effects of having had advance notice on the
probability of a displaced worker©s having a positive duration of nonemployment found in table 5.4 in the text are obtained using equation (A5.8")Testing for Exogeneity
We are concerned with whether we can treat the advance notice variable
as exogenous in estimating the probability of nonemployment. The procedure
for testing is easiest to describe for a linear model, so we do this first. Write
equation (A5.1) as
(A5.9) y*=x10+x2|32 +u
where x2 is the variable that we wish to test for exogeneity. Write x2 as
(A5.10) x2 =x2 +v
where x2 is an instrumental variable predictor of x2 and v is the residual.
Substituting into (A5.9) we obtain
(A5.ll) y*=x101 +/32x2 +/32 v+u.
Under the null hypothesis that x2 is exogenous, the coefficients on x2 and v
are the same. If x2 is endogenous, then the coefficient on v, say /33, will not
be equal to /32. We add and subtract 02v in (A5.ll) to get
(A5.12) y*=xtj31 +|32(x2+v)+(,33 - &) v+u=x101 +x2/32 +a(x2 - x2)+u
where a=(j83 - 02). If x2 is exogenous then a=0. Hence the test for endogeneity is based on this coefficient.

90
The same testing procedure applies to the probit model. We construct an
estimate of x2, say x2 , and ask whether adding (x2 - x2) to the probit equation
adds to the explanatory power. Either the likelihood ratio test or the Wald
test ("t-test") on at can be used since both are asymptotically equivalent. 2 In
addition, the choice of the instrument for x2, x2, does not affect the properties
of the test. We used both linear probability and probit models to construct
an instrument for the advance notice variable in the text, with little difference
in results.
Finally, notice that in a linear framework we can replace (x2 - x2) in equa
tion (A5.12) with x2 and have an algebraically identical test statistic. In the
probit model the two methods are not identical algebraically but are asymp
totically equivalent. Regardless of whether we used RADV and RADV, or
RADV and (RADV - RADV), we always concluded that it was legitimate to
treat advance notice as exogenous. Similar methods were used in the text to
test for the exogeneity of RADV in duration of nonemployment analysis and
again we concluded that one could treat advance notice as exogenous.
Analyses of Duration of Nonemployment
The General Model
Let T be the random duration of nonemployment, conditional on some
positive amount of nonemployment time. We assume that duration T has a
probability distribution characterized by a density function f(t) and a distribu
tion function F(t)=P(T < t).
Initially, suppose that nonemployment time comes in a single spell. If a com
pleted spell is observed, that is, we see the spell and or know the length of
the entire spell, then the contribution to likelihood is the density of the dura
tion time t which is f(t). On the other hand, if the spell is in progress at the
survey date, then we do not know the length of the complete spell, but only
the current length. Therefore we only observe a "censored" duration, and
we only know that the completed duration T is at least as long as the observed
current length t. In this case, the contribution to the likelihood is P(T > t) = 1 P(T<t)+P(T=t) = l -F(t), since we assume continuous distributions so that
P(T=t)=0.
We wish to condition on a set of explanatory variables x which are thought
to affect the distribution of duration. We must specify a particular form for
that distribution, which will depend on a set of parameters 0. Therefore, we
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write the density function for duration as f(t | x,0). Let c be an indicator variable
that takes the value 1 if the spell is complete and 0 if the spell is censored.
We observe (t, c, x) in the data and write the likelihood of a single observa
tion as
(A5.13) L=[f(t|x,0))c [1 - F(t|x,0)]d -c).
Maximizing the log of equation (AS. 13) yields maximum likelihood estimates
0 of the parameters 6.
The Importance of Censoring
A simple example helps illustrate the importance of allowing for censoring.
For simplicity we ignore any explanatory variables and consider a homogeneous
population whose durations follow an exponential distribution:
(A5.14a) f(t)=a exp(- at), a>0.
(A5.14b) F(t)=P(T<t)=exp(- at).
The parameter a in this model is the"hazard rate," that is, the rate at which
durations end. In this simple model the escape rate is constant over time, and
the mean duration is
(A5.15) E(T) = l/a.
Letting i index individuals, the maximum likelihood estimate a from a sam
ple of size N is
N
N
(A5.16) a=£ c,/ E tj,
that is, the number of completed spells divided by the total observed duration.
If we ignored the censoring and treated all spells as if they were complete,
then our estimate a of a would be
N
(A5.17)a=N/£ tj,
that is, the number of individuals divided by total observed duration. Note
that a>a, and therefore (1 /a) <(!/&). Thus we would systematically
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underestimate spell length by ignoring censoring. Intuitively, the censored spells
are longer than what we observe, and ignoring that leads us to believe that
there are too many short spells, relative to the true population.
Distributional Assumptions
We employ a number of different distributional assumptions about f(t | x,0)
in order to ensure that our results are not an artifact of a particular choice.
Our procedure differs slightly from the simplified ones outlined above, so we
sketch it here.
We work with the natural logarithm of duration rather than duration itself.
Let TO be the random duration time for an individual whose covariates x are
all equal to zero. We then assume that the covariates enter as follows
(A5.18) T(x)=T0 expCx©,3),
where /3 is a vector of parameters. Then we have
(A5.19) log T=x©/3+log To.
Define /* = x©|3, W = log T, and W0 = log T0, and rewrite equation (A5. 19) as
(A5.190 W=/i+W0.
In general we allow for a scale effect a, so that the general model takes
the form
(A5.20) W=/* + a W0 =y/3 + a W0.
This model is equivalent to writing duration as
(A5.180 T(x)=

a

These models are called "location-scale models for log t." 3
The distributions we consider are the exponential, the lognormal, and the
gamma. The first is characterized by a constant exit rate while the latter two
allow for exit rates that vary over time. The exponential and the lognormal
are special cases of the gamma. We will illustrate the procedure and the basis
of inference using the exponential distribution. The details for the others are
similar but rather messy.
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Start from the model in equation (A5.14) but now write the exit rate a as
(A5.21) a= exp(-jt) = exp(-x©|3).
Conventional methods for driving the distribution of a function of a random
variable yield the following expression for the density of the log of duration
W=log T:
(A5.22) g(w)= exp(w-jt) exp[-exp(w-jt)]
where n=\/0. The survival probability is
(A5.23) l-G(w)= exp[-exp(w-ji)],
where G(w) = P(W < w).
Given these probabilities one can write down the likelihood function and
maximize it using standard methods. The estimates presented in tables 5.5 and
5.6 in the text are obtained in this manner.
Interpretation of Parameters
We are interested in the change in expected duration that would occur due
to a change in an explanatory variable, x. For the exponential model we have
(A5.24) aE(t|x)/ax=j3/a=|8 exp(x©/3).
Note that this effect will be different for individuals with different values of
x. The effect is 0 for the (nonexistent) individual for whom all x©s are zero
(including the intercept). However, the sign of the effect will be the same as
the sign of #, and the effect is zero only if /3 is zero. Our interest is in the
coefficient of the advance notice variable and for our purposes it is sufficient
to test the null hypothesis that its coefficient is zero. If we fail to reject that
hypothesis, as we do in the text, then we have no evidence in favor of the
proposition that advance notice, affects duration of nonemployment once a
worker loses his or her job, conditional on having some nonemployment time.
Multiple Spells
The SDW data do not allow us to distinguish between the case of a single
spell of nonemployment of length t and the case of multiple spells whose lengths
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sum to t. For this reason, one cannot give the usual structural interpretation
to the parameters in our duration equations that is usually given in duration
analyses. Except in special cases, the sum of two random variables does not
have the same distribution as the original random variables. Therefore the ap
propriate interpretation of our procedure is a "curve-fitting exercise." We
have approximated the true distribution with a variety of functional forms.
Since our results are robust to changes in functional form, we are confident
that they are not merely artifacts of a particular model.
Determination of Censoring

As noted above, the proper treatment of censored durations is important in
this type of analysis. The maximum duration reported in the data is 99 weeks;
durations that were longer are also recorded as 99 weeks. As such, it is clear
that a 99 also represents a censored observation.
Chapter 6

Details of most of the econometric issues that arise in this chapter have been
discussed in the sections above. Estimation of the probit probability of employ
ment as of the survey date equations and interpretation of the resulting coeffi
cients follows the discussion above in (A5.1) to (A5.8) about the probit prob
ability of experiencing positive duration of nonemployment equations. Cor
rections for possible sample selection bias in the estimated survey date earn
ings equation are implemented in an analogous manner to the corrections for
possible sample selection bias in the predisplacement earnings equations discuss
ed in (A4.1) to (A4.6) above. Finally, treating predisplacement earnings as
endogenous in the analyses reported in table 6.5 in the text required us to use
an instrument for it. This instrument was obtained using the variables described
in the notes to table 4.1.
NOTES
1. This model corresponds to equation (4.10) in the text. We consider the more general selection
model ((4.7 to (4.9)) in the text below.
2. Silvey (1975), chapter 7.
3. See Lawless (1982), especially chapter 6, for a further discussion of these models.
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